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This-study examines the views of F. A. Hayek on the role of reason in human
affairs. The author explicates certain elements of Hayekian theory that bear on this
issue-his views on the nature of mind, rules, law, and cultural evolution-and discusses the
characteristics of both the constructivist and critical "kinds of rationalism" Hayek identifies.
She then examines the views of various critics who have challenged Hayek's
argument. She concludes that, contrary to certain critics, 1) the distinction he draws
between constructivist and critical rationalism is meaningful and that the two kinds of
rationalism appear to be related to certain political views; 2) whether Hayek, despite his
criticism of the constructivistic conceit, should himself be considered a constructivist
depends on whether one adopts a broad or narrow interpretation of constructivism; and
3) Hayek's method of social criticism-what he terms "immanent criticism"-does provide

the basis for a meaningful critical theory.
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Reason's Source
It's not that my mind knows less than it did before,
but that its reason finally deduced
the magic of its source,
and sensed beneath of logic of its ways
the deeper spontaneous order
that powers its own thought.

-Jane Roberts

ONE
THE CONTRIBUTION OF

F. A.

HAYEK

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) spent his formative years absorbing the
cosmopolitan culture of turn-of-the-century Viennese society. He was, it appears, to the
academy born. His family had long been distinguished by its scholarly and scientific
pursuits (zoology, botany, chemistry, law); Ludwig Wittgenstein was a distant cousin.
Hayek received Ph.D's in both law and political economy from the University of
Vienna in 1921 and 1923 respectively; 1 his teacher was Friedrich von Wieser, the great
economist of the Austrian School. 2 Later in the decade, he worked and studied with
Ludwig von Mises. Hayek tells us that Mises's Socialism, published in 1920, had a
decisive, if gradual, influence on his intellectual development. It led him from the Fabian
socialism of his youth toward the radical anti-socialism with which his name is today
indelibly associated. 3
Hayek is a rarity in the modern age of academic specialization, a scholar equally
accomplished in several fields. His earliest achievements stemmed, as he put it, from a
"very pure and narrow" 4 preoccupatio_n with economic theory. His first major work, Prices

1

John Gray, Hayek on Liberty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 141.

2

The Austrian School of Economics, founded by Carl Menger in 1871, is a distinctive tradition in
economic thought. The Austrian School is characterized by: 1) its theory of subjective value-the
notion that value does not inhere in objects and events but is attributed to phenomena only by a
perceiving mind; 2) "methodological individualism" -the idea that social phenomena can only be
explained by tracing their origin to individual acts of perception and behavior; and 3) its explication of
the "genetic" or evolutionary origin of social institutions. See F. A. Hayek, "Friedrich von Wieser,"
The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume IV, The Fortunes of Liberalism (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1992), 108-125; and Norman P. Barry, Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy
(London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1979), 22-26.
3

4

"Ludwig von Mises," Fortunes, 126-159. See also Gray, 141.

F. A. Hayek, "Kinds of Rationalism," Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 91.

2
and Production ( 1931), led to a position at the London School of Economics, where he
remained as Tooke Professor of Economics and Statistics from 1931 to 1950. 6
Throughout these years, Hayek made seminal contributions to theoretical economics:
capital theory, trade-cycle theory, monetary theory, history of economic thought, and the
development of Austrian economic theory. He is considered the foremost Austrian
economist of the twentieth century and has been widely recognized for his pathbreaking
identification of the "knowledge problem" to which the market order is the solution. In
1974, Hayek (along with Gunnar Myrdal) was awarded the Nobel prize in economic
science: The Nobel committee especially commended Hayek's "profound historical expose
of ... doctrines and opinions in th[e] field of centralized planning ... [as well as his] ...
penetrating analysis of the interdependence of economic, social and institutional
phenomena. " 6
Hayek's "second career," so to speak, has been as a political and legal philosopher.
From 1950 until 1962 he was professor of social and moral sciences and chair of the
Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago. From 1962 until his
retirement, he remained in Europe, first at the University of Freiburg (1962-69) and then at
the University of Salzburg. Upon retirement from Salzburg, Hayek returned to Freiburg as
professor emeritus, where he remained until his death in March 1992. 7
During this time, Hayek's chief scholarly concerns were, as mentioned, in political
and legal philosophy (although in 1952 he published a work in theoretical psychology, The

5

Hayek became a naturalized British citizen in 1938. Barry, x.

6

"The Official Announcement of the Royal Academy of Sciences," in John Cunningham Wood and
Ronald N. Woods, eds, Friedrich A. Hayek: Critical Assessments, Volume II (New York: Routledge,
1991), 189-191.
7

Barry, x-xi.

3
Sensory Order, which sets forth his theory of the mind and lays the psychological
foundations of his social and political theory). Hayek's work in economics had convinced
him that the solutions to the great problems of our age could not be approached
exclusively through advance in theoretical economics, and he returned to the interdisciplinary approach typical of the great classical theorists of moral philosophy and
political economy. His deepening commitment to classical liberalism reflected his growing
recognition of the functional interdependence of law, politics, and economics.
Hayek's reputation as a major political theorist was established by the publication
of The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and the three-volume Law, Legislation, and Liberty
(1973-79). Several volumes of essays on various aspects of politics, economics, and
methodology of the social sciences were also published in 1967 and 1978. At the age of
88, he published his final work, The Fatal Conceit, a restatement of some of his earlier
views and an elaboration of his theory of cultural evolution. Hayek was a prolific writer; he
published more than twenty books, thirty pamphlets, and numerous articles and reviews. 8
Hayek is perhaps the foremost contemporary representative of the classical-liberal
political tradition. In 1947 he founded the Mont Pelerin Society, 9 conceived as an
international forum in which then-isolated classical-liberal scholars could exchange views
with their colleagues throughout the world. It remains today one of the most prestigious
organizations devoted to the perpetuation and elaboration of the classical liberal ideal. 10

8

An extensive bibliography of Hayek's works may be found in Gray's Hayek on Liberty, 143-209.

9

Charter members included Wilhelm Ropke; Michael Polanyi; Bertrand de Jouvenal; Milton
Friedman; Karl Popper; Lionel Robbins; George Stigler; and Walter Lippman. "Opening Address to a
Conference at Mont Pelerin," Fortunes, 237.
10 •1ntroduction,"

Fortunes, 14.
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II
Hayek's influence on both mainstream academic thought and contemporary political
affairs has been checkered. During the 1930s, his consistent opposition to the views of

J. M. Keynes brought him widespread academic recognition, and, upon the 1944
publication of The Road to Serfdom, he became for a time "the second most famous
economist on the planet." 11 The post-war ascendancy of Keynesian ism, however, was
accompanied by a corresponding decline in Hayek's prestige and influence. Then in the
1970s, both the disintegration of the Keynesian consensus and his recognition by the
Swedish Academy contributed to a revival of interest in Hayek's work. Several expository
and critical commentaries have been produced by young scholars. 12 A four-volume
collection of critical assessments 13 and four volumes of an anticipated nineteen-volume
set of his Collected Works have also appeared. 14 Graduate seminars on Hayek's legal and
political philosophy are becoming, if not commonplace, then at least available. 16
Despite the respect and acclaim accorded Hayek by his peers, he nevertheless
remains something of a marginal figure in mainstream academic thought. This is no doubt

11

John Gray, "Hayek as Conservative," Post-Liberalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 4.

12
These include: N. Barry, Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy (London, 1979); J. Gray,
Hayek on Liberty (Oxford, 1984); R. Butler, Hayek: His Contribution to the Political and Economic
Thought of Our Time (London, 1983); B. L. Crowley, The Self, the Individual, and the Community:
Liberalism in the Political Thought of F. A. Hayek and Sidney and Beatrice Webb (Oxford, 1987); and
C. Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism (Oxford, 1989). Source: Kukathas, 3.
13

John Cunningham Wood and Ronald N. Woods, eds, Friedrich A. Hayek: Critical Assessments,
Volumes I-IV (New York: Routledge, 1991).
14

These are: Volume I: The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (1988); Volume Ill: The Trend
of Economic Thinking: Essays on Political Economists and Economic History (1991 ); and Volume IV:
The Fortunes of Liberalism: Essays on Austrian Economics and the Ideal of Freedom (1992),
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
15

For instance, at Oxford, the London School of Economics, Dalhousie University, and George
Mason University.
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partially a result of Hayek's inter-disciplinary approach to the study of social affairs. More
importantly, however, Hayek's views run against the current of both mainstream economic
and political thought, and for somewhat the same reasons. On Hayek's view, both of
these disciplines are preoccupied with the wrong questions. 16 Neo-classical economists
are obsessed with the mathematical description of static "equilibrium" states, and modern
political theorists since John Rawls are obsessed with contriving and justifying preferred
conceptions of appropriate "distributive" patterns. Neither are especially concerned with
investigating the nature of the social process and the constraints it imposes on the
political, legal, and economic institutions of the liberal order, Hayek's own principal
concern. Hayek's views (and those of the Austrian School in general) pose a challenge to
the dominant paradigms in both disciplines, and it is not surprising that he never achieved
the popularity of theorists more in accord with the prevailing outlook.
Hayek's influence on practical affairs has nevertheless been substantial. His views
inspired the economic policy adopted by Ludwig Erhard in post-World War II Germany. 17
Many of the market-oriented reforms instituted by Margaret Thatcher and the New Right in
Great Britain in the 1980s were instituted by adherents to Hayekian views. David
Stockman admired his work. 18
Hayek is perhaps better known in Europe and Canada than in America. His
philosophy, however, is congenial to certain American conservatives, those who, like
Robert Nisbit, are disturbed by the erosion of traditional centers of authority-church,
family, custom-that has accompanied the growth of centralized political power, as well as

16

Cf. Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and Modern Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 3-4.

17

"1ntroduction," Fortunes, 13-14.

18
Conrad P. Waligorski, The Political Theory of Conservative Economists (Lawrence: The
University Press of Kansas, 1990), 11.

6
those who appreciate Hayek's emphasis on the concrete historicity of social evolution. His
views also have some appeal to libertarians and others who are alarmed by the dramatic
growth in government that has occurred in the Western democracies throughout the
twentieth century, as well as to the "market-liberal" and "public-choice" schools
represented by thinkers such as Milton Friedman and James Buchanan. Curiously, certain
"postmodern" philosophers also appear to have "discovered" Hayek. His life-long
repudiation of scientistic social science and his evolutionary approach to epistemology are
in sympathy with certain post-modern critiques of rationalism and scientific
methodology . 19
It is difficult to place Hayek's thought on the conventional liberal/conservative
spectrum. Through some eyes, he appears as a modern rationalistic liberal while others
perceive him as a representative conservative thinker. His work is discussed in both The

Liberal Tradition in European Thought and The Conservative Tradition in European
Thought. 20 This is appropriate, for Hayek does not belong to either the modern liberal or
conservative camps. He is, as he puts it, an "unrepentant Old Whig" 21 in the tradition of
David Hume, Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, T. B. Macaulay, and Lord Acton. It is
more a sign of the times and the inadequacy of the conventional categories than an
ambiguity in Hayek's position that critics can not agree on the appropriate label for his
views. He is, quite simply, a liberal in the nineteenth-century European sense of the term.

19

Cf. G. B. Madison, "Hayek and the Interpretive Turn," Critical Review (Spring 1989): 169-185.

20

Cited in Waligorski, 6.

21

F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 409.

7

111
Throughout a lifetime of scholarly investigation, Hayek was concerned to explore
certain epistemological issues that bear on social-science methodology in general and
economic and political theory in particular. Among the major of these issues lie the
following: the extent to which human reason is capable of 1) consciously co-ordinating
the actions of the numerous members of any complex social order; and 2) determining
either the rules or values that should govern a society or the ends that its members ought
to pursue. Such epistemological concerns were central to Hayek's investigations because
he believed the rise of the illiberal collectivist ideologies he was concerned to refute
(especially, socialism and its variants) could be attributed, in large part, to mistaken notions
concerning the nature and function of human reason. 22
According to Hayek, the Western liberal tradition has been shaped by two distinct
schools of thought-the French rationalist and the British evolutionary traditions-which
embrace very different conceptions of liberty, social order, and the role of reason in human
affairs. 23 Our interest lies in the distinction Hayek draws between the two "kinds of
rationalism" 24 which he believes are related to the two schools. Adherents to the French
tradition, he claims, typically exhibit a profound (if mistaken) regard for the constructive
powers of reason and tend, moreover, to attribute social order to rational design and
conscious intention (views Hayek associates with what he terms "constructivist or naive

22
F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (London: The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1955).
23

Constitution, 54-62.

24

"Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 82-95.

8
rationalism" 26 ). The evolutionary school, which Hayek himself represents, 26 is
characterized, on the contrary, by an acute awareness of the limits to the constructive
powers of reason and an understanding of social order as the unintended outcome of rulegoverned human behavior (views Hayek associates with an "evolutionary or critical
rationalism " 27 ).
One of Hayek's principal concerns, then, is to repudiate the "constructivist" view
that man is able consciously to construct or invent social institutions such as law and
morals because he possesses "reason." He argues that proponents of such "design
theories" misunderstand the processes responsible for the growth of civilization and
attribute unjustified authority to human reason in regard to both cultural advance and the
creation of the Good Society. Hayek claims, in short, that the constructivistic political and
scientific views that have prevailed since the Enlightenment embody a false epistemology
which engenders legislation and public policy that must undermine the institutional
foundation of the liberal order. 28
Hayek, one might say, is still doing battle with the Enlightenment. Carrying on the
anti-rationalist project begun by David Hume, he is still striving to "whittle down the claims

25 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 1, Rules and Order, (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1973), 8-34. Among the "constructivists" identified by Hayek are: J. J. Rousseau,
Voltaire, Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, the Mills, Auguste Comte, G. F. W. Hegel, Karl Marx, and
Thomas Jefferson.
26
Hayek's classical liberalism, then, should be distinguished from such rationalistic strains of
liberalism as contractarian and rights-based theories, both of which, on Hayek's view, attribute
unjustified authority to human reason in suggesting that social institutions have been or should be
constructed for a determinate purpose.
27 /bid.

Representative thinkers within this tradition include: Bernard Mandeville, David Hume,
Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, T. B. Macaulay, Lord Acton, William Gladstone, Alexis
de Tocqueville, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich von Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt, and, in America, James
Madison, John Marshall, and Daniel Webster.
28 Constitution,

231-233; also, Rules and Order, 32-33.

9
of reason by ... rational analysis, " 29 for he believes that the preservation of liberal
institutions depends upon our willingness to be governed by certain inherited rules of

'
individual and collective conduct
whose origin, function, and rationale we may not fully
comprehend. 30 He also believes, however, that rational insight into the nature and
requirements of the liberal order will both commend allegiance to traditional liberal
principles of limited government and the rule of law and reveal the poverty of rationalist
schemes of social reconstruction. He pleads for reason-insight, comprehension,
recognition -to prevail over rationalism and to do so by recognizing limits to the scope of
its authority and competence. Only thus, he suggests, may we prevent the "destruction of
indispensable values" 31 that, for Hayek, is the tragic, if unintended, consequence of the
Enlightenment project.

IV
Paradoxically, Hayek, the "rational persuader, " 32 spent his life seeking rationally to
delineate the limits to the authority and competence of human reason. The purpose of this
study is threefold: to explore those limits in some depth; to evaluate whether the
distinction Hayek draws between constructivistic and critical rationalism contributes to our
understanding of the appropriate role of reason in human affairs; and to determine whether

29

Constitution, 69.

30

/bid, 62.

31

Rufes and Order, 6.

32

Sir Arnold Plant, "A Tribute to Hayek-the Rational Persuader," Economic Age 2 (Jan/Feb 1970):

4-8.

.
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his own thought is entirely free from the very kind of rationalism-the constructivist
kind-he is concerned to repudiate.
In the following chapter, "Reason, Evolution, and Design," we present an
exposition and explication of certain aspects of Hayek's philosophy relevant to the issue of
the role of reason in human affairs. We examine his views on the nature of mind, reason,
rules, law, cultural evolution, and the characteristics of the constructivist and critical
rationalist manners of thinking.
In chapter three, "Criticism and Commentary," we endeavor to determine whether
Hayek in fact draws a clear and meaningful distinction between the two "kinds of
rationalism" or whether, as certain critics have contended, the categories are too imprecise
and confused to be useful as explanatory constructs. We shall also explore whether
Hayek's preferred method of social criticism-what he terms "immanent criticism" provides guidelines that enable us to distinguish between the proper use (critical
rationalism) and improper abuse (constructivism) of our rational faculties or whether, as
several critics claim, his extreme "anti-rationalism ... [and] ... and quietest traditionalism
virtually disable" 33 critical evaluation of existing social institutions and practices.
We shall also inquire whether the position Hayek takes on the role of reason is
entirely consistent or coherent. As one critic puts it, " ... given his view of the limited role
reason can play in social life, how is it possible [for Hayek] to mount a systematic defence
of liberalism without falling victim to the very kinds of rationalism he criticizes?" 34 To
such critics, Hayek appears to resort to the constructivistic approach he condemns in other

33

Norman P. Barry, "Hayek on Liberty," Zbigniew Pelczynski and John Gray, eds, Conceptions of
Liberty in Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 280.
34

Kukathas, vii.
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thinkers and he thus stands accused of self-contradiction and inconsistency. We shall
attempt to determine whether such charges are valid.
The conclusions of our study may be briefly summarized as follows: 1) Contrary
to certain of Hayek's critics, we shall argue that his distinction between constructivistic
and critical rationalism is meaningful and useful and that certain conceptions of the nature
and capacity of human reason appear to be related to certain political views. Hayek may
be faulted, however, for failing precisely to specify the defining attribute of each of the
"kinds of rationalism," a failure which has led to accusations of vagueness and ambiguity.
2) Whether Hayek, despite his criticism of the constructivistic conceit, should himself be
considered a constructivist depends on whether we adopt a broad or narrow interpretation
of constructivism. If we interpret constructivism broadly as the endeavor to employ reason
in the rational design of a social order, then, Hayek must plead guilty to endorsing, to a
limited degree, the constructivism he simultaneously denounces. If, however,
constructivism is interpreted narrowly as the belief that reason is adequate to the tasks of
either determining an appropriate concrete pattern for a complex society or consciously
regulating the particular affairs of its members, then Hayek is no constructivist. 3) Hayek's
method of "immanent criticism," we shall argue, is adequate to the task he assigns it and
does provide the basis for a meaningful critical theory.
We argue, in short, that those critics who perceive fundamental and "unresolvable
conflicts" 36 within Hayek's position or:i reason exaggerate. The undeniable tension that is
generated by the play of rationalist and anti-rationalist elements in his thought is curious
and paradoxical, but not "incoherent. " 36 And although, in our opinion, the distinction

35

Kukathas, 201.

36

As Kukathas, for instance, suggests, Ibid, 228.
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between constructivism and critical rationalism does clarify the role of reason in political
affairs, we conclude that Hayek has not completely foresworn what one commentator calls
his "lingering commitment to ... rational reconstruction .... " 37
The role of reason in political affairs has been of perennial interest to political
philosophers. If Hayek is correct, however, our interest in such matters should be more
than academic. For Western liberal society presently stands at a curious juncture. The
authority of the moral and political traditions whose observance generated the liberal order
has eroded in many quarters, and it has been suggested that we are living on the "moral
capital" of an earlier era. Hayek obviously hopes that rational insight into the function
served by nonrational political and moral traditions in regard to the maintenance of liberal
society may supply the want of traditional authority-religion and custom-increasingly
characteristic of our time.

37John

Gray, Liberalisms (New York:

~outledge,

1989), 99.

Any social processes which
deserve to be called social
in distinction to
the actions of individuals
are almost ex defmitione not conscious.

-F. A. Hayek

Two
REASON, EVOLUTION, AND DESIGN

Although the concept of reason plays a central role in Hayekian philosophy, one
will search in vain for a definition of reason in his work. On the whole, when Hayek
speaks of reason, he seems to refer to a conscious thought process that endeavors to
discern patterns in human experience and to predict and control the consequences of
action. Reason, he suggests, encomP,asses the capacity to be "guided ... by
foresight-by conscious ... insight into the connections between ... particular known
mea11s and certain desired ends. " 38 Elsewhere, however, Havek suggests that rationality
(he does not explicitly distinguish between either "reason" and "rationality" or "reasonable"
and "rational") is " ... no more than some degree of coherence and consistency in a
person's actions, some lasting influence of knowledge or insight which, once acquired, will
affect his action at a later date and in different circumstances. " 39
Hayek also maintains that behavior guided by habit, custom, and tradition is
rational "in the sense of [not] being contrary to intelligent action" ; 40 one of his main
contentions is that "[t]here [isl ... 'intelligence' incorporated in the [inherited] system of
rules of conduct [as well as in] man's [explicit] thoughts about his surroundings. " 41 It is
fair to say that, for Hayek, rationality is as much an attribute of the social process as of the
.

.

individual mind, that he "locates rationality not [only] in the isolated, individual

38 F. A. Hayek, "The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics,
and the History of Ideas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 6-7.

39

Constitution, 77.

40

/bid, 34.

41 F.

A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 3, The Political Order of a Free People
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 157.

14

consciousness but [also] in the netwo.rk of social institutions. " 42 The sort of rationality
embedded within the social process, however, is different from the conscious, explicit
mental activity engaged in by the reasoning intellect; "[a]ny social processes which
deserve to be called social in distinction to the actions of individuals are [for Hayek] almost
ex definitione not conscious. " 43 In general, Hayek is less concerned to define and

describe the capabilities of reason than to show that "men are in their conduct never
guided exclusively by [a rational] ... understanding of [cause and effect] ... but always
also by rules of conduct of which they are rarely aware, [and] which they certainly have
not consciously invented. " 44
Hayek seems to conceive reason as an indispensable tool that serves a primarily
negative function: to "steer" 45 or restrain action motivated by ultimately nonrational
factors (instinct, impulse, morals, values). 46 He emphasizes that reason, by itself, can
never .determine the ends of action. 47 It can do so only in conjunction with one of these

42

Kukathas, 97.

43 The

Counter-Revolution of Science, 87. Moreover, "the only 'reason' which can in any sense be
regarded as superior to individual reason does not exist apart from the inter-individual process in
which, by means of impersonal media, the knowledge of successive generations and of millions of
people living simultaneously is combined and mutually adjusted, and that this process is the only form
in which the totality of human knowledge ever exists" (Ibid, 91 ).
44

"The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 7.

45

Rules and Order, 32.

46 Values ... are the ends which reason serves but which reason cannot determine .... " "Kinds of
Rationalism," Studies, 87. "Like all other values, our morals are not a product but a presupposition of
reason, part of the ends which the instrument of our intellect has been developed to serve."
Constitution, 63.
47
Rules and Order, 32. Hayek, we should note, employs the terms "value" and "end," and
"opinion" and "will," in a special sense. The first term of either pair refers to the abstract and the
general, while the second terms refer to the particular and concrete.

Will and End: A human will, for Hayek, is always concerned with the achievement of a "particular,
concrete result which, together with the known particular circumstances of the moment, will suffice

15

non rational factors and will, moreover, "often tell us only what not to do. " 48 Reason, he
claims, "is merely a discipline, an insight into the possibilities of successful action, " 49 a
servant of given values which it did not create and which it cannot justify.
Reason does, on Hayek's view, provide guidance in the determination of human
action. It enables man to identify inconsistences and contradictions in his thought and
action, 60 conflicts of values, and perhaps the appropriateness of means to given ends, as
well as to deduce, infer, calculate, and so on. Reason is capable, moreover, of recognizing
its own limitations and sphere of competence: "Surely, one of the tasks of reason is to
decide how far it is to extend its control or how far it ought to rely on other forces which it

to determine a particular action"(F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 2,. The Mirage of
Social Justice (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 13). The will "ceases when the
'end' -the particular expected effect ... which motivate[s] a particular action-is achieved" (Ibid).

Opinion and Value: Opinions and values, by contrast, refer to certain general abstract aspects of
social life. Opinion, which "constitutes a lasting disposition which will guide many particular acts of
will" (Ibid), expresses a view about the desirability or undesirability of particular "manners of acting";
and it leads to approval or disapproval of conduct according as it does or does not conform to one's
own view of what is right and proper. One's opinion, then, provides the basis for one's evaluation of
many particular events that possess only certain abstract features in common and is, in itself,
insufficient to determine a particular action; it will do so only in combination with some particular goal
(Ibid, 13-14).
Similarly, the term "value" as Hayek employs it "refer(s] to generic classes of events, defined
by certain attributes and generally regarded as desirable. By 'desirable' ... we ... mean more than
that a particular action is in fact desired by somebody on a particular occasion; it is used to describe a
lasting attitude of one or more persons towards a kind of event" (Ibid).

48
Rules and Order, 32. Hayek does not elaborate on this statement, but he implies that reason
can, for instance, persuade us to abandon beliefs which have been demonstrated to be untrue or
methods and means that have proven not to "work." It can assist, then, in the elimination of error
and clarify the choices with which we are confronted. It can "falsify" but not prove. CounterRevolution, 90.

49
/bid, 32. Hayek notes that "one of the lexical meanings of [discipline] is "systems of rules of
conduct," a meaning close to his view. "Epilogue," The Political Order of a Free People, 160.
50

"Reason's most important but very unpopular task [is to] point out the inner contradictions of our
thinking and feeling." "The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 20.
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cannot wholly control .... " 61 Hayek also notes with approval that "to the medieval
thinkers reason had meant mainly a capacity to recognize truth ... when they met it. " 62
Only later, under the influence of Cartesian doctrines, did the capacity to reason become
identified exclusively with " ... that faculty of the understanding which forms trains of
thought and deduces proofs, " 63 a conception that Hayek explicitly rejects. 64
We shall perhaps gain a fuller understanding of Hayek's conception of reason as we
examine the characteristics of the two "kinds of rationalism" he identifies and critiques.
Before we do so, however, we shall explore certain elements of Hayek's theoretical
framework that bear on his conception of the role of reason in human affairs.

I.

THE LIMITS TO REASON

There appear to be as many conceptions of the role of reason in human affairs as
there are political philosophers and traditions. 66 This confused state of affairs may,
Hayek suggests, be related to the fact that Western philosophy has long been dominated

51

Rules and Order, 29.

52

1bid, 84.

53

"By reason, however, I do not think is meant here the faculty of the understanding which forms
trains of thought and deduces proofs, but certain definite principles of action from which spring all
virtues and whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals." John Locke, cited in "The
Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 19.
54

"Reason, which had included the capacity of the mind to distinguish between good and evil, that
is between what was and what was not in accordance with established rules, came to mean a
capacity to construct such rules by deduction from explicit premises. The conception of natural law
was thereby turned into a 'law of reason' and thus almost into the opposite of what it had
meant. . . . " Rules and Order, 21 .

55

Cf. Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1988).
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by the "false dichotomy" 66 between the "natural" (instinctual, biological) and the
"artificial" (conventional, contrived, consciously designed) it inherited from the ancient
Greeks. Since few philosophers 67 could bring themselves to attribute culture exclusively
to biology, they were more or less compelled to regard it as the product of rational or
intelligent design. Instinct and reason appeared to exhaust the possible explanatory
variables. 68 The false choice posed by the exclusive alternatives of nature and
convention, however, may have led many students of social and cultural phenomena to
misunderstand the role of reason in their determination.

The Priority of Tradition over Reason

According to Hayek, culture and civilization are neither "natural" products of
biological instinct nor "artificial" products of the reasoning mind. 69 Such phenomena are,
instead, the product of another distinct endowment-tradition.

Man became all he is

because he is as much a "rule-following" 60 as a rational animal. He flourished because he

56

Rules and Order, 20.

57

Except perhaps contemporary "sociobiologists"!

58

"1 want to call attention to what does indeed lie between instinct and reason, and which on that
account is often overlooked just because it is assumed that there is nothing between the two." The
Fatal Conceit, 21 . See also p. 143 of that work.
59
"Culture is neither natural nor artificial, neither genetically transmitted nor rationally
designed .... " The Political Order of a Free People, 154.
60

Rule, as conceived by Hayek, is a very broad concept. He defines "rule" as "a propensity or
disposition to act or not to act in a certain manner," (Rules and Order, 75) as a general disposition
that governs a very wide class of actions, perceptions, or thought. The observance of rules is
manifested in "regular" or patterned behavior, "in what we call a practice or custom." Ibid.
Hayek identifies three kinds of rules which "make possible the formation of social order[:) 1)
rules that are merely observed in fact but have never been stated in words; if we speak of the 'sense
of justice' or 'the feeling for language' we refer to such rules which we are able to apply, but do not
know explicitly; 2) rules that, though they have been stated in words, still merely express
approximately what has long before been generally observed in action; and 3) rules that have been
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evolved a highly developed capacity to absorb and transmit learned rules 61 -rules
embodied in his cultural traditions-that structure and govern his thought, perception, and
behavior.
One of Hayek's principal concerns, then, is to refute the notion that human beings
were somehow able to "create" culture and civilization because they were beings uniquely
endowed with "reason." Man, he tells us, did not possess a developed ability to reason
prior to the emergence of established traditions. 62 He " ... became intelligent because
there was tradition-that which lies between instinct and reason-for him to learn. " 63
... [l]t was a repertoire of learnt rules which told him what was the
right and what was the wrong way of acting in different
circumstances that gave him his increasing capacity to adapt to
changing conditions-and particularly to co-operate with the other
members of his group. Thus a tradition of rules of conduct, existing
apart from any one individual who learnt them, began to govern
human life. It was when these learnt rules, involving classifications
of different kinds of objects, began to include a sort of model of the
environment that enabled man to predict and anticipate in action

deliberately introduced and therefore necessarily exist as words set out in sentences. Constructivist
would like to reject the first and second groups of rules, and to accept as valid only the third
group .... " "The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 8-9.
61

See page 21 for a more extensive discussion of the process whereby man acquires and transmits

rules.
6

2The capacity unconsciously to acquire and transmit rules necessarily operated long before man
possessed language, let alone the capacity to "reason." The ability to reason-to identify relations of
"cause and effect," to dedu.ce, infer, calculate, "critically analyze," and so on-could not have
developed prior to the habitual observance of certain nonrational traditions and rules. Prolonged
habitual response was requisite even to the formation of a neurological structure capable of perceiving
an environment sufficiently "regular" to suggest the existence of stable relations among phenomena.
"Learning how to behave is more the source than the result of insight, reason, and
understanding ... it is not our intellect that created our morals; rather, human interactions governed
by our morals make possible the growth of reason and those capabilities associated with it. Man
became intelligent because there was tradition ... for him to learn, a tradition ... [which] originated
not from a capacity rationally to interpret observed facts but from habits of responding. It told man
primarily what he ought or ought not to do under certain conditions rather than what he must expect
to happen." The Fatal Conceit, 21-22.

63

1bid, 21.
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external events, that what we call reason appeared. There was
then probably much more 'intelligence' incorporated in the system
of rules of conduct than in man's thoughts about his surroundings.
It is therefore misleading ·to represent the individual brain or mind as
the capping stone of the hierarchy of complex structures produced
by evolution which then designed what we call culture. The mind is
embedded in a traditional impersonal structure of learnt rules, and
its capacity to order experience is an acquired replica of cultural
pattern which every individual mind finds given. The brain is an
organ enabling us to absorb, but not to design culture. . . .64

As we shall

discus~

more fully below, Hayek argues that the mind itself must be

recognized as an evolved and evolving phenomenon, a structure as adapted to the
circumstances of human existence as the physical body. Such a mind could (and can)
evolv:~

only because there were pre-existing traditions-habitual behaviors, customs, and

practices-to absorb: "It may well be asked whether an individual who did not have the
opportunity to tap ... a cultural tradition could be said even to have a mind." 66 The
ability to reason, in short, is fully a product of social experience and, moreover, a relatively
recent development within the vast frame of human history. 66 "Man did not possess
reason before civilization. The two evolved together." 67
According to Hayek, then, man's ability to acquire and transmit cultural rules is the
main "cause" of his cultural advance. Such a capacity insures that each generation need

64

"

Epilogue," The Political Order of a Free People, 157.

65
The Fatal Conceit, 23. Hayek considers his conception of culture similar to Karl Popper's
conception of "world 3" -a body of phenomena "kept in existence by millions of separate brains
participating in it [that is] ... the outcome of a process of evolution distinct from the biological
evolution of the brain .... [Moreover,] ... mind can exist only as part of [this other] ...
independently existing distinct structure or order [i.e., culture]. though that order persists and can
develop only because millions of minds constantly absorb and modify parts of it .... " Political Order
of a Free People, 157.
66

67

Political Order of a Free People, 156, 160.

"The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 3-4. "This [the issue of the priority of reason or
civilization] is, in a way, a 'hen or egg' kind of question-nobody will deny that the two phenomena
constantly interact." "Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 86.
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not begin life "from scratch," but can build upon the cumulative experience and knowledge
gained by its predecessors. Moreover, Hayek maintains that those rules (both tacit and
explicit) that were preserved long enough to form a "tradition" were preserved because
they had proved in practice to contribute to the effectiveness and flourishing of the groups
who observed them. 68 Those that prevailed, in other words, served a function in regard
to the maintenance of the social order, a function, however, of which no one need have
been consciously aware.
[Custom and tradition] ... were not formed by drawing reasoned
conclusions from certain facts or from an awareness that things
behaved in a particular way. Though governed in our conduct by
what we have learnt, we often do not know why we do what we
do. Learnt moral rules, customs, progressively displaced innate
responses, not because men recognized by reason that they were
better but because they made possible the growth of an extended
order exceeding anyone's vision in which more effective
collaboration enabled its members, however blindly, to maintain
more people and to displace other groups. 69

We shall discuss Hayek's theory of cultural evolution more fully below.

68

As we shall discuss more fully below, Hayek associates human flourishing with increased
population, individuation, and specialization, which, he believes, are prerequisite to both material and
spiritual advance. What he argues is that certain groups proliferated and prevailed because they
"stumbled upon" certain rules whose observance unwittingly "create[d] an ordered structure which
increase[d] the power of the individuals without having been designed by any one of them." CounterRevolution, 8 7.
69

The Fatal Conceit, 23.
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On the Acquisition and Transmission of Rules

All creatures obey rules in the sense that their behavior may be described in terms
of observed regularity. 70 Man is distinguished, of course, by his more highly developed
capacity to learn-to acquire culturally transmitted rules.
According to Hayek, the acquisition and transmission of rules is effected by an
essentially non-rational process of observation and imitation-what may be termed
"sympathetic identification." Long before humans acquire language, they observe and
imitate the actions of their fellows, thereby tacitly acquiring "knowledge how" 71 to
perceive and behave in accordance with prevailing cultural rules. We are generally little
aware of the extent to which our minds and experience are structured and governed by
rules acquired in such a manner. 72
Perhaps the most striking example of the human ability to absorb and act upon
highly complex rules prior to the development of the reasoning mind is the child's ability to
learn language-to master complicated syntactical patterns, to speak "as if" it knew the

70 Regularity,

of course, is merely the temporal manifestation of rule-governed behavior.

71

Hayek sometimes employs Gilbert Ryle's terminology- "knowing how" and "knowing that" -to
express the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. "The Primacy of the Abstract," New

Studies, 38.
7

2The acquisition of perceptual and behavior rules also occurs simultaneously with the acquisition
of language: " ... [M)an's capacity to think is not a natural endowment of the individual but a
cultural heritage, something transmitted not biologically but through example and teaching-mainly
through, and implicit in, the teaching of language. The extent to which the language which we learn
in early childhood determines our whole manner of thinking and our view and interpretation of the
world is probably much greater than we yet aware of .... [T)he structure of the language itself
implies certain views about the nature of the world and by learning a particular language we acquire a
certain picture of the world, a framework of our thinking within which we henceforth move without
being aware of it. As we learn as children to use our language according to rules which we do not
explicitly know, so we learn with languag~ not only to act according to the rules of language, but
according to many other rules of interpreting the world and of acting appropriately, rules which will
guide us though we have never explicitly formulated them .... " "Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 86-

87.
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rules of grammar-solely by means of imitation and analogy. 73 Moreover, it is obvious to
us that no one "made" these rules of grammar the child so unerringly observes; the body
of grammar we have developed merely articulates the rules "found" to be governing the
operation of the mind. 74

We further recognize that our "feeling for language" (that is,

our ability to follow rules that we may not be able explicitly to state) remains the
indispensable guide to appropriate speech and writing.
We have emphasized the nonrational character of the process whereby one learns
to speak and master language because, according to Hayek, it is also the process whereby
one learns the rules that structure and govern one's thought, perception, and behavior. 76
Just as no one learns to speak by studying a grammar text, so no one learns to think or
behave by studying the rules of logic or law. Moreover, the relation between spoken
language and formal rules of grammar is wholly analogous to the relation between
traditional social practices and the formal rules of law. As little as the rules of grammar are
the product of reason are the rules of law. 76

73

"Rules, Perception, and Intelligibility," Studies, 43-45; and "The Primacy of the Abstract," New
Studies, 38-39.
14

/bid.

75 "The

important point is that every man growing up in a given culture will find in himself rules or
may discover that he acts in accordance with rules-and will similarly recognize the actions of others
as conforming or not conforming to various rules." Rules and Order, 19.
76 "The

Primacy of the Abstract," New Studies, 46-48; and "Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 86-87.
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A Digression on Law: The Grammar of Practice
"The aim of jurisdiction," Hayek tells us, "is the maintenance of an ongoing order
of actions. " 77 He thus reminds us that all law tacitly presupposes the existence of and
refers to an ongoing factual order of activities, a comprehensive "background order"
which, "although ... the result ... of the regularities of the actions of the individuals,
must be clearly distinguished from them .... " 78
According to Hayek, law in the sense of enforced rules of conduct is coeval with
society, for the de facto observance of common rules is what constitutes even the most
primitive social group. 79 Prevailing rules will not necessarily be recognized or explicitly
treated as rules but will manifest themselves as habitual perception or behavior-as
customs and conventions. Those who practice certain inherited customs may not be
aware that in so doing they contribute to the maintenance of the social order..:_they may
merely "know" that certain actions are taboo or "just not done" -yet those whose task it
is to articulate the enforceable rules will be guided, more or less consciously, by an
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Rules and Order, 98.

781bid, 74. "Only when ·it is clearly recognized that the order of actions is a factual state of affairs
distinct from the rules which contribute to its formation can it be understood that such an abstract
order can be the aim of the rules of conduct." Ibid, 114. See Appendix A for a discussion of the
character of the "background order" to which Hayekian theory refers and Appendix B for a discussion
of the attributes and source of law.
79 Contrary to J. J. Rousseau et al, Hayek claims that early man did not know solitude; man always
and only existed as a member of a group.· "The savage is not solitary, and his instinct is ...
collectivist .... [In the beginning, notes Hayek,) ... a solitary man would have been a dead man."
The Fatal Conceit, 12. Both the "state of nature" and the "social contract" are myths.
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awareness that the rules "refer to certain presuppositions of an ongoing order which no
one has made but which nevertheless is seen to exist. " 80
The rules that structure modern liberal society, then, refer to certain
presuppositions and requirements of that kind of social order, presuppositions and
"inchoate rules" 81 that are closely related to the "sense of justice." Once again, an
analogy drawn from language may assist our understanding. As one's "feeling for
language" enables one to recognize the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the spoken
or written word without explicit knowledge of the rule applicable to the case at hand, so
one's "sense of justice" enables one to recognize an inappropriate (or "unjust") rule or
action without necessarily being able to articulate the rule that has been violated. As the
task of the grammarian is to articulate the general rule that governs a particular linguistic
usage, so the task of the judge or jurist is to "discover" the general rule that (implicitly or
explicitly) governs the case at hand. The rules of both law and grammar, then, are part of
that abstract structure of rules "found" to be governing the operation of the mind. 82
The task of the judge, then, is not to "invent" or construct good law but to bring to
conscious awareness the general principle or rule which, when once expressed, will be

80

Rules and Order, 96.

81

0r "principles," Ibid, 119.

82 Both the "feeling for language" and the "sense of justice" can thus be explained in terms of
Hayek's theory of the mind. As we discussed, Hayek contends that all behavior and perception are
governed by the abstract system of rules that constitutes the mind. These rules govern behavior
regardless of whether they have been recognized or expressed in words. Some persons may be better
at successfully articulating the rules that underlie social interaction in a given culture, but rules of both
grammar and justice govern the operation of the mind long before they have been explicitly stated or
discursively described. This is why Hayek says that rules are "found," not made. To repeat: "The
important point is that every man growing up in a given culture will find in himself rules or may
discover that he act in accordance with rules-and will similarly recognize the actions of others as
conforming or not conforming to various rules." Ibid, 1 9.
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recognized as just (or at least not unjust)-which means, more or less, as in conformity
with the implicit rule that has customarily guided spontaneous interaction in a given
society. 83 The law that emerges from the law-finding efforts of judges or jurists (for
instance, the English common law) always emerges, in other words, as a result of
"effort[s) to secure and improve a system of rules which are already observed." 84 All
valid law, including the law that structures the spontaneous order of liberal society, is,
according to Hayek, of this nature (see Appendices A and 8).
Hayek is concerned, then, to show that evolved social phenomena such as law and
language exhibit certain similarities.

~irst,

law, like grammar, refers to a factual overall

-

order- (or abstract pattern)-an objective order which is the unintended result of human
perception and behavior yet which is distinct from that behavior-of which actors and
speakers are, in general, only tacitly aware. Second, the rules whose observance
generated liberal society were as little the product of rational design or deliberate invention
as were the rules of grammar. They emerged, instead, through the ongoing efforts of
judges to articulate, develop, and interpret the (implicit and explicit) rules that structured a
pre-existing order of actions. 86
The development of law, in other words, always proceeds within a given
framework of values, rules, and practices, the observance of which generates the overall
social order. The task of the judge or jurist, although certainly an intellectual task, is not

83

Rules and Order, 76-78.

84

/bid, 96.

85

/bid, 98-123.
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one that entails the exercise of deductive reasoning or syllogistic logic. 86 In resolving
disputes, the judge is, in effect, asked to clarify which of conflicting expectations are to be
treated as legitimate. And that depends, in turn, on the requirements of the overall social
order and not, we may note, on his or anyone else's preferences, rational or otherwise. 87

The Process of Cultural Evolution
According to Hayek, our inherited social institutions, morals, language, and law88
are the outcome of a process of cultural evolution, 89 selected, at bottom and over the
long run, for their human survival-value. Those that survived this process did so because
they ~'assisted the proliferation" 90 and "enhanced the prosperity of certain groups ...
[and thus] ... led to the formation of larger orderly groups of gradually increasing size. " 91

86 "Like

most other intellectual tasks, that of the judge is not one of logical deduction from a limited
number of premises, but one of testing hypotheses at which he has arrived by processes only in part
conscious." Ibid, 120.
871bid,

115, 119-120. "(T)he rules of just conduct which emerge from the judicial process ... are
discovered in the sense that they merely articulate already observed practices or in the sense that
they are found to be required complements of the already established rules if the order which rests on
them is to operate smoothly and efficiently." Ibid, 123. Even the very first rules "discovered" by the
earliest counterpart of the judge were not the product of reason, but of an effort to articulate a rule
which had long been honored in action as evidenced by the customary practices of the people. Ibid,

76-78.

88

Constitution, 57.

89

A process, we should note, that is ongoing

90

The Fatal Conceit, 75.

01 By both "more rapid procreation [and) ... the attraction of outsiders." Political Order of a Free
People, 155-159.
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Those customs and traditions that have endured over time did so, in short, because they
"increased the chances of survival of the group[s)" 92 who observed them.
Hayek's argument is that certain nonrational rules and practices (which may have
originated as "irrational" taboos, superstitions, or religious beliefs93 ) spread via a process
of imitation and emulation because the observance of such rules unwittingly produced an
overall order of activities that was capable of supporting larger and larger numbers of
persons. " ... [l]t is the efficiency of the resulting order of actions which ... determine[s]
whether groups whose members observe certain rules of conduct will prevail. " 94 Those
groups who observed what proved to be superior rules thus gradually displaced those
group·s who observed what proved to be less-adaptive rules and practices.
Learnt moral rules, customs, progressively displaced innate
responses, not because men recognized by reason that they were
better but because they made possible the growth of an extended
order exceeding anyone's vision in which more effective
collaboration enabled its members, however blindly, to maintain
more people and to displace other groups. 95
The structures formed by human practices ... are ... the result of
a process of winnowing or sifting, directed by the differential
advantages gained by groups from practices adopted for some
unknown and perhaps purely accidental reasons .... [The] present
order of society has largely arisen, not by design, but by the
prevalence of the more effective institutions in a process of
com petition. 96
The reason why one rule rather than another was adopted and
passed on will be that the group that had adopted it did in fact
prove the more efficient,· not that its members foresaw the effects

92Rules and Order, 18. "For the numbers kept alive by differing systems of rules decide which
system will dominate." The Fatal Conceit, 130.

93

The Fatal Conceit, 157.

94

Rules and Order, 7 4.

95 The
96

Fatal Conceit, 23.

/bid, 154-55.
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the rule would have. What would be preserved would be only the
effects of past experiences on the selection of rules, not the
experiences themselves. 97

Hayek claims, then, that the "process of selection [of rules is] guided not by reason
but by success .... Cultural selection is not a rational process; it is not guided by but it
creates reason. " 98
Hayek's ultimate criterion for evaluating the "success" of social institutions and
practices, which no doubt shocks moralists of all persuasions, is the number of persons the
social order that results from their observance can support. 99 Although he acknowledges
that the morality that produced the Western liberal order " ... is not justified by the fact
thatit enables us to ... survive, [i]t does enable us to survive and there is something
perhaps to be said for that .... We may not like the fact that our rules were shaped
mainly by their suitability for increasing our numbers .... Life, [however,] exists only so
long as it provides for its own continuance. Whatever men live for, today most live only

because Of the market Order. nlOO

97

Rules and Order, 5.

98

"Epilogue," Political Order of a Free People, 166.

99 Norman

Barry suggests, however, that Hayek's "ultimate political criterion [is some sort of]
vague, indirect-utilitarian ... progress" (Norman P. Barry, "The Liberal Constitution: Rational Design
or Evolution?" Critical Review (Spring 1989): 275). (Hayek, incidentally, conceives of "[p)rogress
[as) movement for movement's sake, for it is in the process of learning, and in the effects of having
learned something new, that man enjoys the gift of his intelligence" (Constitution, 41 ).) Barry's
observation is consistent with Hayek's numbers criterion because, for Hayek, "population increase is
crucial to prosperity" (The Fatal Conceit, 155) and "pre-requisite for any advance in both material and
... spiritual civilisation" (Ibid, 122), primarily because the larger the population, the greater the
human individuation, differentiation, and specialization: "It is not simply more men, but more different
men, which brings an increase in productivity. Men have become powerful because they have
become so different .... " (Ibid, 122-23).
100

The Fatal Conceit, 32-33.
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Hayek's argument, then, is that the "extended order of human cooperation," 101
his term for the Great or Open Society 102 that characterizes modern Western civilization,
was brought into being because its members observed certain values (private property,
honesty, truthfulness, saving, respect for the individual, and so on). Such values, he
contends, "serve a function or 'purpose'" 103 in regard to the maintenance of the social
order-even more, the "existing factual order exists only because people accept [these]
values. " 104 Consequently, we who wish to preserve a free and liberal society are
constrained to observe certain rules and values despite the facts that we may not
comprehend their rationale or significance or obtain happiness or pleasure in the
process .105

The Theory of the Mind
Hayek's views on the role of reason in human affairs should be understood in light
of his general theory of the mind. The human mind, he tells us, is an evolved (and
evolving) phenomenon which consists of a system of abstract rules, a structure shaped in
response to both the individual's and the species' experience within social and physical
reality. 106 The mind is a self-organizing "classificatory apparatus" 107 (a spontaneous

101 /bid, 6.
1o2 Hayek

uses these terms to described advanced civilized societies characterized by an extensive
division of labor and knowledge and integrated by common economic, legal, and moral practices.
Modern liberal society is, of course, a Great Society in the Hayekian sense.
103 "Kinds
104 "The

of Rationalism," Studies, 87.

Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 21.

105Mirage, 27. "There is in fact no reason to expect that the selection by evolution of habitual
practices should produce happiness." The Fatal Conceit, 64.

106

/bid, 1 7.
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order) which enables man to classify (and thus perceive 108 ) phenomena according to
certain salient aspects. The mind, in short, "does not so much make rules as consist of
11109

rules.

Hayek argues, moreover, that the nature of the mind insures that man always
knows more than he can say, for "mental activity must always be guided by some rules
which we are in principle not able to specify. " 11

°

Certain rules, he claims-those that

"shape the [very] categories of our understanding" 111 -must permanently elude
conscious identification .
. . . (T]his would follow from ... the theory of sets .... [l]n any
system of classification [such as the mind] there are always more
classes than things to be classified, which presumably implies that
no system of classes can contain itself.
It would thus appear that Godel's theorem is but a special case of a
more general principle applying to all conscious and particularly all
rational processes, namely the principle that among their
determinants there must always be some rules which cannot be
stated or even be conscious. 112

107

Kukathas, 49.

108According to Hayek, the simultaneous imposition of many classificatory rules results in what we
term perception. " ... [A]ll·sensations, perceptions, and images are the product of a superimposition
of many 'classifications' of the events perceived according to their significance in many respects."
"The Primacy of the Abstract," New Studies, 36.

"Our perception of the external world is made possible by the mind possessing an organizing
capacity." Ibid, 38.
109 Rules

and Order, 18.

110 Hayek,

111

cited in Gray, Hayek on Liberty, 22.

/bid, 23.

112/bid,

22. See also "Rules, Perception, and Intelligibility," Studies, 61.
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Or, as Don Lavoie explains it, "The very process by which an articulated statement is
formulated must itself remain inarticulate. If an attempt is made to articulate this process,
then the process by which that attempt is made remains inarticulate." 113
This is an important component of Hayek's theory of the mind, for, if true, it means
that "[c]onscious thought must be presumed to be governed by ... a supra- or metaconscious mechanism which operates on the contents of consciousness but which cannot
itself be conscious." 114 Hayek' s point is that the nature of the mind permanently limits
the degree to which we can consciously control human experience.

//.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF REASON

Although Hayek is at pains to emphasize the significance of tradition, inarticulate
rules, and custom to human experience, he does not wish to denigrate the importance of
rational reflection. His aim, he tells us, is to "make reason as effective as possible,
••• "

116

and this, he maintains, requires a recognition of reason's proper sphere of

authority.
. .. [l]f our stress has ... been necessarily on [the limits to
reason,] we have certainly not meant to imply thereby that reason
has no important positive task. Reason undoubtedly is man's most
precious possession. Our argument is intended to show merely that
it is not all-powerful and that the belief that it can become its own
master and control its own development may yet destroy it. What
we have attempted is a defense of reason against its abuse by
those who do not understand the conditions of its effective
functioning and continuous growth. It is an appeal to men to see
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Lavoie, "The Market as a Method for Discovery and Conveyance of Inarticulate Knowledge,"
John Cunningham Wood and Ronald N. Woods, eds, Friedrich A. Hayek: Critical Assessments,
Volume IV (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1991 ), 228.
114"Rules, Perception, and Intelligibility," Studies, 61. Certain rules are inaccessible to the
conscious reasoning mind not because they are unconscious or subconscious, but because they
"proceed on too high a level [of abstractness or generality.)" Ibid.
115

Rules and Order, 29.
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that we must use our reason intelligently and that, in order to do
so, we must preserve that indispensable matrix of the uncontrolled
and non-rational which is the only environment wherein reason can
grow and operate effectively .
. . . What is advocated here is not an abdication of reason but a
rational examination of the field where reason is appropriately put in
control. 116

The Growth of Rationality

Hayek believes, then, that reason has a crucial role to play in human experience,
and he is concerned to maintain the conditions which he considers indispensable to its
further evolution. Because the mind is an evolving structure that develops only through its
encounter with the realm of concrete experience, he argues, freedom of action is
indispensable to the growth of rationality. Man became and becomes rational through
experiencing the consequences of his actions; he does not and can not learn solely in the
abstract. The development of rationality depends upon man's ability to experience for
himself the disappointment and fulfillment of his expectations. 117 "Freedom," in brief,
"is necessary to make man rational." 118
Contrary to the "overintellectualized conception" 119 of certain political theorists,
Hayek argues that "discussion, ... though ... essential ... is not the main process by
which people learn. Their views and decisions are formed by individuals acting according
to their own designs; and they profit from what others have learned in their individual
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Constitution, 69.

m"Man learns by the disappointment of expectations." Constitution, 30.
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Kukathas, 140.
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Constitution, 110.
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°

experience." 12

For Hayek, knowledge is preeminently practical, embodied in concrete

tools, customs, and habits, as well as in abstract rules, symbols, and inarticulate
"techniques of thought." 121 His views on the growth of rationality are very close to Karl
Popper's views on the growth of scientific knowledge: both " ... must be conceived as an
interpersonal process in which everyone's contribution is tested and corrected by
others." 122 Like scientific hypotheses, the products of reason must be considered
tentative and provisional, conjectures that can be refuted but never proven or conclusively
demonstrated. Moreover, reason, like science and like civilization itself, advances only by
grappling with the unknown and the unpredictable. Consequently, "the only environment
wherein reason can grow and operate effectively ... [is the] indispensable [realm] of the
uncontrolled and non-rational .... " 123
If we were to restrict action to only that in accord with some preferred conception
of the "rationally permissible, " 124 we would, Hayek argues, smother the spontaneous
trial-and-error process whereby reason and civilization advance. "We might conceive of a
civilization coming to a standstill, not because the possibilities of further growth had been
exhausted, but because man had succeeded in so completely subjecting all his actions and
his immediate surroundings to his existing state of knowledge that there would be no
occasion for new knowledge to appear." 126 The endeavor to rationalize the social

120/bid.
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Lavoie, 45.

122 The Counter-Revolution of Science, 61.
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Constitution, 69.
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Kukathas, 139
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Constitution, 38.
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order 126 -to subject the social process to deliberate conscious control-must induce the
stagnation and ultimately the decline of both human intelligence and civilized society.
Reason, Hayek warns, "is like a dangerous explosive which, handled cautiously, may be
most beneficial, but if handled incautiously may blow up a civilization." 127

The Primacy of the Abstract 128

Hayek is impressed by the fact that the human mind is so very limited. Man
cannot foresee the future with any de.gree of certitude. He may not clearly recognize his
own values, purposes, or ends, ends which must, moreover, continually change in
response to changing circumstances. Worst of all and most significant to Hayek, man is
incurably ignorant of most of the concrete facts and circumstances prevailing in his
environment-his mind is simply incapable of grasping reality in all its infinite concrete
complexity. 129 Despite these facts, he must somehow determine "how to act" and
"what to do" within this complex environment. How is this accomplished?
According to Hayek, man survived and flourished 130 because he evolved a mind
adapted to the kind of environment in which he dwells, a mind, as we have noted, that
operates to classify (and thus perceive and manipulate) phenomena according to certain
abstract aspects. Abstractness, Hayek tells us, is not exclusively a property of conscious
thought or mental concepts. It is, rather, "a characteristic possessed by all the processes

126 And not merely to develop individual rationality
127

/bid, 94.

128 "The Primacy of the Abstract," New Studies, 35-49.
129 Rufes

and Order, 13.

130Again, in terms of the criteria discussed in "The Process of Cultural Evolution"
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which determine action long before they appear in conscious thought or are expressed in
language[:] ... Whenever a type of situation evokes in an individual a disposition toward
a certain pattern of response, that basic relation which is described as 'abstract' is
present."

131

Abstractness thus conceived is a property of all thought, perception, and

action.
Abstractness, moreover, is not a quality produced by means of induction or
inspection of concrete phenomena: we do not abstract from a myriad of concrete
phenomena and subsequently derive abstractions such as truth, justice, danger, happiness,
and so on. Hayek suggests, on the contrary, that abstractness or generality is
"primary" 132 to the experience of concreteness (the secondary or derived phenomenon).
As he puts it:
Abstraction is not something which the mind produces by processes ·
of logic from its perception of reality, but rather a property of the
categories with which it operates-not a product of the mind but
rather what constitutes the mind. We never act, and could never
act. in full consideration of all the facts of a particular situation, but
always by singling out as relevant only some aspects of it; not by
conscious choice or deliberate selection but by a mechanism over
which we do not exercise deliberate control. " 133

This mechanism, Hayek believes, is the outcome of a process of evolutionary
selection. The capacity to structure experience by means of abstract concepts and rules is
an adaptation that allows man to orient himself in a world most of whose concrete
particulars must remain forever unknown to him. It is an evolved solution to problems that
stem from the fact that man's mind is incapable of fully mastering or comprehending the
infinite complexity of concrete phenomena which comprise the human environment.

131

/bid, 30.
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Rules and Order, 30.
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Hayek wishes to emphasize, then, that reason is only competent in the realm of the
abstract: " ... [Wlhen we say what all men have in common is their reason we mean their
common capacity for abstract thought." 134 Reason and abstraction do permit us to
achieve a degree of mastery over experience, a mastery which extends, however, only to
certain general features of our environment and experience. "[Albstractions help our
reason go further than it could if it tried to master all the particulars," 136 but, according
to Hayek, our constitutional inability to foresee all the extended ramifications of our actions

or to take into account all the concrete circumstances which determine their outcome
necessarily restricts the degree of control we can exercise over the concrete manifestation
of the social order .
. . . [T)he incurable ignorance of everyone ... is the ignorance of
particular facts which are or will become known to somebody and
thereby affect the whole structure of society. This structure of
human activities constantly adapts itself, and functions through
adapting itself, to millions of facts which in their entirety are not
known to anybody ... It [isl one of our chief contentions that most
of the rules of conduct which govern our actions, and most of the
institutions which arise out of this regularity, are adaptations to the
impossibility of anyone taking conscious account of all the particular
facts which enter into the order of society. 136
The use of abstraction extends the scope of phenomena which we
can master intellectually[;) it does so by limiting the degree to
which we can foresee the effects of our actions, and therefore also
by limiting to certain general features the degree to which we can
shape the world to our liking. Liberalism, for this reason, restricts
deliberate control of the overall order of society to the enforcement
of such general rules as are necessary for the formation of a
spontaneous order, the details of which we cannot foresee. 137
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Rules and Order, 33.
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136/bid, 13.
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We have discussed the nature of abstraction at some length because, in my
opinion, the refusal to recognize that reason, by itself, is powerless to determine concrete
particulars and thus to devise an appropriate concrete pattern for a complex society lies at
the heart of constructivism. 138 Hayek's fundamental contention is that reason can not,

by itself, either determine particular concrete ends that persons should "collectively"
pursue or consciously coordinate the concrete affairs of the inhabitants of an advanced
society. 139
We shall return to this issue when we examine the character of Hayekian
constructivism more closely. For now, we note that, for Hayek, classical liberalism's
reliance on guidance by abstract principles and the restrictions this places on the content
of law and policy in liberal society stem from inherent limitations of the human mind.
His thesis is that abstract liberal political principles and rules of justice are, like abstract
moral rules, adaptations to man's permanent epistemological predicament 140 -to the fact
that " ... human intelligence is quite insufficient to comprehend all the details of the

138 As

we mentioned, several critics have challenged the usefulness of Hayek's
constructivist/critical rationalist classificatory scheme. I shall argue that Hayek's division makes sense
when understood in terms of attitudes toward abstractness and reason's ability to determine the
concrete.
139 There is, of course, a relationship between the abstract and the concrete, but, on Hayek's view,
it is the inverse of the usual conception. The concrete, he suggests, presupposes the abstract: the
perception of the concrete is a function of the mind's ability to classify phenomena according to
certain abstract aspects. See "The Primacy of the Abstract," New Studies, 35-49. The perception
and evaluation of concrete phenomena, then, necessarily varies with the different beliefs, values, and
circumstances of the perceiving individuals. Value, for instance, does not inhere in external
phenomena but is attributed to them by a perceiving mind. The subjective theory of value is one of
the cornerstones of the Austrian School in which Hayek was trained. See G. B. Madison, "Hayek and
the Interpretive Turn," Critical Review (Sp~ing 1989): 174-176.

i4o"The fact of our irremediable ignorance of most of the particular facts which determine the
processes of society is ... the reason why most social institutions have taken the form they actually
·
have." Ibid, 13.
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complex human society . . . . [According to Hayek,] ... it is this inadequacy of our reason
to arrange such an order in detail which forces us to be content with abstract rules .•
• "

141

-on his view, the only type of legal rule that can sustain a liberal order (see

Appendices A and B). 142

Liberal Principles are "Moral Rules for Collective Action" 143
According to Hayek, moral rules (such as the attribution of free will and
responsibility) are "devices" 144 man has stumbled upon to make the limited rationality he
does possess "go as far as possible. " 146 We hold persons responsible because we hope
to influence their behavior in the future, to encourage them to "act more rationally than
they otherwise would. " 146 Similarly, we allow persons to reap or bear the consequences
of their actions so they will rationally attend to the particular circumstances over which

141

"Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 88.

142Constitution, 205-21 2; 234-44; 411. Although liberal principles and rules of law were not the
product of conscious construction or enlightened invention, Hayek claims that reason (in the sense of
rational insight) can comprehend the function such evolved phenomena perform in regard to the
maintenance of the liberal order. He believes that experience, observation, and rational
argument-science, in short-can inform our conscious understanding and commend allegiance to
liberal rules and institutions. Hayek does not argue that abstract thought is more "rational" than our
attitudes toward particular and concrete phenomena but that reason, by itself, can not determine the
desirability of such particularities. Nor does he claim that it is more "rational" (in some absolute
sense) to observe abstract liberal principles in our collective conduct than collectively to pursue
concrete objects. It will only be rational to do so if we desire to preserve the liberal order. Only if we
value that kind of order, in other words, will his appeal to rational understanding fall on fertile ground.
As we noted, reason, for Hayek, is always a servant of ultimately nonrational phenomena (values,
morals, impulses, and so on).

143 Constitution, 68.
144Rules and Order,

29.

145 Constitution, 77.
146/bid, 76. " ... [T]he assigning of responsibility does not involved the assertion of a fact. It is
rather of the nature of a convention intended to make people observe certain rules." Ibid, 75.
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they do have some control. 147 Hayek maintains, then, that many of our evolved social
institutions are adaptations that both extend man's limited rationality and foresight and
buffer the most severe or dangerous consequences of their inadequacy.
Most of the rules of conduct which govern our actions, and most of
the institutions which arise out of this regularity, are adaptations to
the impossibility of anyone taking conscious account of all the
particular facts which enter into the order of society .... Rules are
a device for coping with our constitutional ignorance. There would
be no need for rules among omniscient people who were in
agreement on the relative importance of all the different ends. Any
examination of the moral or legal order which leaves this fact out of
account misses the central problem .... Rules of conduct [are] ...
a means for overcoming the obstacle presented by our ignorance of
the particular facts which ... determine the actions of all the
several members of human society. 148

Hayek argues, moreover, that liberal political principles (limited government,
individual liberty, private property, contract, equality under the law, and so on) should be
conceived as evolved "moral rules for collective action." Such principles, like moral rules
and like reason, serve an essentially negative function: to tell us what we must refrain
from doing if we wish to prevent undesirable consequences. 149 Such evolved social
phenomena are, one may say, the distilled essence of the practical knowledge and
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1bid, 71-78.

A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 2, The Mirage of Social Justice (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 8, 12-13.
148 F.

149 For instance, the destruction of the social order; perpetual strife, conflict, chaos; violence; the
inability to adapt to changing circumstances; suppression of knowledge; stagnation; the inability to
make Jong-range plans; the subjugation of the individual; and so on. "And in avoiding danger it is as
important to know what one must never do as to know what one must do to achieve a particular
result." Rules and Order, 18. It is not solely "reason," however, that informs our conviction that
such phenomena are undesirable. The re~ults of the experience of former generations are, on Hayek's
view, embedded within the perceptual and moral rules which we unconsciously absorb throughout the
process of enculturation. Parents teach their children that it is wrong to destroy or steal others'
property, for instance. They do not necessarily do so because they consciously recognize that the
delimitation of property rights is requisite to the formation of a coherent, peaceful order, but because
their perception and behavior are governed by certain deeply ingrained traditional rules that have been
preserved and transmitted precisely because they have proven indispensable to the maintenance of

the social order.
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experience gained by our predecessors, preserved and transmitted because they have
proven in practice to contribute to the flourishing of the groups who observed them.
Those that prevailed did so because they constituted a better adaptation to the kind of
environment in which man dwells.
Just as a man, setting out on a walking tour, will take his pocket
knife with him, not for a particular foreseen use but in order to be
equipped for various possible contingencies, or to be able to cope
with kinds of situations likely to occur, so the rules of conduct
developed by a group are not means for known particular purposes
but adaptations to kinds of situations which past experience has
shown to recur in the kind of world we live in. Like the knowledge
that induces one to take his pocket knife with him the knowledge
embodied in the rules is knowledge of certain general features of
the environment, not knowledge of particular facts. In other words,
appropriate rules of conduct are not derived from explicit knowledge
of the concrete events we will encounter; rather, they are an
adaptation to our environment, an adaptation which consists of
rules we have developed and for the observance of which we will
usually not be able to give adequate reasons. In so far as such
rules have prevailed because the group that had adopted them was
more successful, nobody need ever have known why that group
was successful and why in consequence its rules became generally
adopted. 150

On "Automatic" v. Conscious Co-ordination of Social Affairs

Before we proceed to examine the character of the two "kinds of rationalism"
Hayek identifies, we should discuss, however briefly, the two methods whereby the
actions of individuals and groups within a society may be co-ordinated: 1) the
"automatic" and spontaneous co-ordination effected by the "market mechanism"; 757 and
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The Fatal Conceit, 19.
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2) the conscious and deliberate arrangement effected by directing the particular actions of
the individuals and the groups in accordance with a preconceived "plan. " 152
The "market," of course, is a metaphor for a complex of social relations,
institutions, and practices. Hayek's thesis is that such phenomena are evolved solutions to
the "central problem" 153 any advanced society must solve: how to generate, utilize, and
co-ordinate knowledge which only and always exists fragmented and dispersed among the
numerous members of any complex society. Indeed, the "price system" 154 should be
conceived as an evolved "medium of communicati[on]" 155 that serves both to bypass
man's ignorance of most of the facts ·that determine the success of his actions (the

152

Hayek recognizes, of course, that Western liberal societies are today ordered by a combination
of these two methods. He maintains, however, that the two distinct ordering principles are opposing
and irreconcilable and that their simultaneous application cannot engender a stable, enduring, or
coherent overall order. One of Hayek's contentions is that piecemeal "interventions" designed to
"rectify" or "improve" the results of the spontaneous ordering process establish precedents which
legitimize demands for the further extension of whatever "principle" can be discerned in the former
"intervention." If the coal miners' incomes are to be protected, why not steel workers', cab drivers',
secretaries, and so on? But, of course, we can not simultaneously "protect" all established positions
and maintain the spontaneous order of liberal society. For Hayek, a "little bit" of political
"intervention" or conscious control is not harmless; it establishes precedents and "produces ... an
alteration in the character of the people" ("The Road to Serfdom after Twelve Years," Studies, 224)
which lead to the gradual transformation of the liberal order into an ever-more-totalitarian
organization. Rules and Order, 3, 114; "The Road to Serfdom After Twelve Years," Studies, 216228.
153

Constitution, 25. ????

154
As we have discussed, Hayek contends that the use of abstraction enables man to overcome
his inability to master the infinite complexity of the environment. The price system is one of those
evolved social institutions that serves to oypass the inherent limitations of the mind and permits
persons to orient themselves in a world most of whose concrete detail they cannot know. Mirage,
113, 116. "Modernity is the result of man's increasing ability to communicate abstract thought."
The "market"-the "negative feedback" mechanism "steered" by the information precipitated in
prices-is the means whereby such communication is effected. "Competition as a Discovery
Procedure," New Studies, 187, and Mirage, 125.
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concrete circumstances prevailing throughout society) and to integrate the actions of
individuals and groups into a coherent overall order. 166
Hayek's argument is that the cultural achievements of Western civilization are not
the product of superior knowledge per se but of the fact that Western society evolved a
method of coordination (the "market mechanism") that encourages the generation and
utilization of more knowledge than any other method yet discovered. No mind or group of
minds could consciously assimilate or coordinate the vast knowledge and information that
daily enters the social process via the market mechanism. 167 The "automatic"
coordination achieved via the market process is, in short, far superior to any method based

-

upon- conscious direction. Conscious direction ("planning") must necessarily restrict the
knowledge employed to that possessed by a few limited minds and thus prevent that
flexible adaptation to ever-changing concrete circumstances whereby the order as a whole
maintains itself (see Appendix A). As we shall see, for Hayek, the constructivist
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Prices, Hayek tells us, are the indispensable guide to action. Without such guidance, persons
could not know how to employ their efforts in a manner compatible with the plans and actions of their
fellows. Without the guidance of prices, human activity would have to be directed by conscious
command (our need for "things" would not disappear if the market were to disappear). Only the
evolution of the price system, in other words, permitted persons to choose the direction of their
efforts. Moreover, we cannot know how resources "should" be employed without the guidance of
undistorted prices that reflect the reality of current circumstances. Ibid, 69-72.
Needless to say, explicating the theory of the market order (or catallactics, as Hayek terms it)
is beyond the scope of this. study. We shall merely point out that, for Hayek, the distinction between
constructivist and critical rationalism is related to the distinction between conscious and automatic coordination of social affairs as represented by the concepts of "planning" and the "market,"
respectively. See F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1948).
157

This is not the complete story, however. Much of the knowledge and information that enters
the market process is of a kind that cannot be consciously communicated or articulated. Knowledge
is a very broad term for Hayek. It consists not merely in explicit, systematized, theoretical knowledge
but in the inarticulate knowledge embodied in "techniques of thought," habits, dispositions, and
customs, as well as in the fleeting local knowledge of time and place whose utilization is so essential
in a complex social order. Lavoie, 213.
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perspective is characterized by an inability or unwillingness to recognize the "astonishing
fact ... that order generated without design can far outstrip plans men consciously
contrive. " 168

Ill.

CONSTRUCTIVIST RATIONALISM

Hayek's argument, as we have mentioned, is primarily directed against certain
epistemological views that he associates with the philosophy of Rene Descartes and the
Enlightenment, views he labels "constructivist rationalism." For Hayek, the constructivist
mentality is characterized by: 1I belief in a socially autonomous human reason capable of
designing civilization and culture; 169 2) a radical rejection of tradition and conventional
behavior; 3) a tendency toward animistic or anthropomorphic thinking; and 4) the demand
for rational justification of values. 160
The "core of constructivism, [Hayek maintains, isl ... a general mental attitude, a
demand for an emancipation from all prejudice and all beliefs which could not be rationally
justified, [an attitude perhaps] best express[edl by B. de Spinoza's statement that 'he is a
free man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone'. " 161 According to Hayek,
this cast of mind leads constructivists to attribute (perhaps implicitly) both the orderly
structure apparent in society and the origin of social institutions to deliberate human

158

The Fatal Conceit, 8.
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A conception, Hayek notes, that is closely related to Cartesian mind/body dualism. Rules and
Order, 17.
160

Rules and Order, 8-11; and "The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 3-22.

16
1"Liberalism," New Studies, 120. Hayek also quotes Alexander Herzen's remark- "You want a
book of rules, while I think that when one reaches a certain age one ought to be ashamed of having
to use one [because] the truly free man creates his own morality" (Rules and Order, 25)-to illustrate
the constructivist attitude.
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invention or rational design. Unable to conceive of social order as the product of
impersonal social forces, the construc.tivist, like the primitive, tends to ascribe all evident
order to the design of a personal orderer and is frequently led more or less consciously to
personify the concept of "society" -to impute blame, responsibility, and purposefulness to
an abstract mental construct. 162 Such naive or animistic thinking, Hayek claims, is
characteristic of all schools of totalitarian, socialist, and interventionist political
thought. 163
"All modern forms of constructivism," 164 he maintains, derive from the
rationalism of Rene Descartes, whose "radical doubt" 166 led him to deny the status of

-

truth- to any statement that could not be logically derived from irrefutable premises. 166
Descartes's many influential followers interpreted his views in a manner that led them to
perceive traditional values, institutions, and customs as the very embodiment of ignorance.
Recognizing, of course, that such phe'nomena could not be rationally justified in accordance
with the canons of Cartesian methodology, they concluded that inherited social institutions
and conventions were more often impediments than aids to human flourishing. "If you
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Rules and Order, 9; Mirage, 75-79.
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"Kinds of Rationalism," Studies, 85.
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"The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 5.
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Rules and Order, 10.
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1t has been suggested that Hayek himself "subscribes to a [Cartesian] view of truth and then
reach[es] the conclusion that there is no truth known to humans" (Dr. Ellis M. West, written
comments, August, 1993). I believe, however, there is a significant distinction between the Hayekian
and Cartesian positions. Perhaps the main difference is that Hayek holds the traditional presumption
in favor of established social institutions and practices-he does not reject them out of hand because
we may not understand their rationale or purpose. He is even willing to grant certain "nonfactual ...
religious ... beliefs" (The Fatal Conceit, 135-36) the status of "symbolic truths" (Ibid, 137). I would
argue, then, that the character of Hayek's "doubt" is very different from that of the Cartesian
rationalist-his inclines toward acceptance rather than rejection of the nondemonstrable. Moreover,
Hayek does believe in the existence of truth- "facts that transcend historical context" (Ibid, 86).
Nevertheless, truth does remain, to his mind, provisional and ever open to refutation.
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want good laws," counseled Voltaire, "burn those you have and make new ones." 167
And it was Reason, these Enlightened thinkers proclaimed, which would liberate mankind
from the ancient fetters of oppressive tradition.
The constructivists' cavalier dismissal of "irrational" tradition, then, is typically
accompanied by a profound belief in the constructive powers of human reason. If mankind
has created society, runs this train of thought, then it must be able to alter its institutions
at will to achieve desired aims. If society is indeed our joint creation, then surely we can
improve the existing order by better design! 168 Constructivists believe, either implicitly
or explicitly, that only those social institutions whose origin, purpose, and manner of

-

operation are fully accessible to the reasoning mind deserve the approval of rational beings.
Through their eyes, the spontaneous and undesigned appear as hardly more than irrational
chaos.
Constructivism, of course, maintains a firm hold on the contemporary mind.
"Intellectuals," in particular, reserve a special affection for all that is "rational,"
"conscious," or "deliberate" in contrast to the "irrational," "conventional," or seemingly
accidental. 169 Moreover, the traditional presumption in favor of established social
institutions and practices has long been abandoned in favor of the "more glamorous" 170
view that social phenomena should and can be subjected to rational control and deliberate
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/bid, 25.
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" • • • [S]ince people had been able to generate some system of rules coordinating their efforts,
[constructivists concluded that) they must also be able to design an even better and more gratifying
system." The Fatal Conceit, 7.
169
/bid, 11. "The influence of rationalism has indeed been so profound and pervasive that, in
general, the more intelligent an educated person is, the more likely he or she now is ... to be a
rationalist .... " The Fatal Conceit, 52-53.

Rules and Order, 9.
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arrangement. The insight that there are limits to the extent to which we can consciously
determine the particular manifestation of a given social order is rejected by "naive" 171
rationalists in favor of an overweening "reason" that believes itself able to create society in
whatever image it chooses.
Hayek argues, however, that the constructivists' vision blinds them to perceiving
the true nature of social reality. Constructivists not only wrongly assume that fully
developed human reason existed prior to social experience and directed man's cultural
advance, but they are susceptible to what Hayek terms the "synoptic delusion[:] ... the
fiction that all relevant facts can be known to one mind and that it is possible to construct

-

from -this knowledge of the particulars a desirable social order. " 172 Misunderstanding
both the origin of social institutions and the nature of reason, constructivists are led to
advocate rules and policy inappropriate to liberal society, for, according to Hayek, the
question of how our order came into being has everything to do with the kind of laws and
policy conducive to its ongoing vitality . 173
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Hayek, following Karl ·Popper, sometimes characterizes constructivism as a "naive rationalism."
Rules and Order, 29.
172

1bid, 14.
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The Fatal Conceit, 6-7. Hayek maintains that ignorance of the origin of law (the evolved rules
of just conduct that result from the articulation of pre-existing practice) leads to the erroneous
positivistic conception that any rule passed by a formal "legislative" body is valid law. Hayek claims,
however, that the evolved rules of justice that induced and maintain the spontaneous order of liberal
society possess specific attributes which legislation-the deliberate construction of rules-will only
possess if it is consciously modeled on the law. On his view, lack of understanding of the nature,
function, and attributes of valid law engenders misguided legislation that must destroy the abstract
framework of rules requisite to the operation of the liberal order. Rules and Order, 114. Also see
Appendices A and B.
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The Demand for Rational Control

For two hundred years, the ideas inherited from the Age of Reason seized the
imagination of political theorists and reformers of various persuasions while the more sober
and modest insights of the evolutionary theorists were largely ignored. 174 To "organiz[e]
... society as a whole, " 175 rationally to construct a new and better world, to replace or
"correct" the allegedly chaotic and irrational "market" process by the scientific or rational
"distribution" of resources-at long last consciously to direct the course of human
evolution-such have been the characteristic ambitions of social reformers throughout the
modern era.
According to Hayek, all forms of modern totalitarianism and collectivism-from the
crudest communism to Fabianism to the "hot" socialism and Fascist corporativism of the
'20s and '30s, through the recurring demands for "social justice" and contemporary calls
for "managed competition" -derive their inspiration from the belief that reason and
conscious direction can produce a more "rational" (and thus superior) allocation of
resources than that achieved by the automatic and spontaneous forces of the
"market." 176
Hayek argues, however, that the demand for rational, conscious ("political") control
of the concrete particulars of social life is based upon a misunderstanding of the process of
cultural evolution and on a hubristic and dangerous overestimation of the capacity of the
conscious reasoning intellect. Civilization, he maintains, is not the creation of the
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reasoning mind, but the unintended outcome of the spontaneous play of innumerable
minds within a matrix of "nonrational" 177 values, beliefs, and traditions.
The whole conception of man already endowed with a mind capable
of conceiving civilization setting out to create it is fundamentally
false. Man did not simply impose upon the world a pattern created
by his mind. His mind is itself a system that constantly changes as
a result of his endeavor to adapt himself to his surroundings. It
would be an error to believe that, to achieve a higher civilization,
we have merely to put into effect the ideas now guiding us. If we
are to advance, we must leave room for a continuous revision of
our present conceptions and ideals which will be necessitated by
further experience .... The conception of man deliberately building
his civilization stems from an erroneous intellectualism that regards
human reason as standing outside nature and possessed of
knowledge and reasoning capacity independent of experience. 178

Hayek argues, moreover, that " ... the desire to make everything subject to rational
control, far from achieving the maximal use of reason, is rather an abuse of reason based
on a misconception of its powers, .. , [for t]rue rational insight into the role of conscious
reason seems indeed to indicate that one of the most important uses is the recognition of
the proper limits of rational control. " 179 Such limits, as we have discussed, stem from
the fact that reason is confronted by an immoveable epistemological barrier: it is
irremediably ignorant of "most of the particular facts which determine the actions of all the
several members of human society." 180 The constructivist's main error, Hayek believes,
is his refusal to recognize that "abstract concepts are a means to cope with the complexity
of the concrete which our mind is not capable of fully mastering." 181 He argues that the
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"rationalist ... revolt against reason is ... usually directed against the abstractness of
thought, [especially] against the submission to abstract rules" 182 and is marked,
moreover, by a passionate embrace of the concrete.
The illusion that leads constructivist rationalists to an enthronement
of the will consists in the belief that reason can transcend the realm
of the abstract and by itself is able to determine the desirability of
particular actions. Yet it.is always only in combination with
particular, non-rational impulses that reason can determine what to
do, and its function is essentially to act as a restraint on emotion, or
to steer action impelled by other factors. The illusion that reason
alone can tell us what to do, and that therefore all reasonable men
ought to be able to join in the endeavor to pursue common ends as
members of an organization, is quickly dispelled when we attempt
to put it into practice. But the desire to use our reason to turn the
whole of society into one rationally directed engine persists, and in
order to realize it common ends are imposed upon all that cannot be
justified by reason and cannot be more than the decisions of
particular wills .... 183
[This is because the] only common values of an open and free
society are not concrete objects to be achieved, but only those
common abstract rules of conduct that secure ... the constant
maintenance of an equally abstract order which merely assure[s] to
the individual better prospects of achieving his individual ends but
g[ives] him no claims to particular things .... 184
Constructivist rationalism rejects the demand for the discipline of
reason because it deceives itself that reason can directly master all
particulars; and it is thereby led to a preference for the concrete
over the abstract, the particular over the general, because its
adherents do not realize how much they thereby limit the span of
true control by reason. 185

Hayek's position runs counter to a well-established tradition in political theory
which, though not as explicitly constructivistic as socialism, nevertheless shares its belief
in the constructive powers of reason. Those who conceive politics to be an intrinsically
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ennobling and civilizing activity often argue that both the substantive content of liberal law
and the common ends of political action should be determined by widespread participation
in "rational" discussion and "reasoned debate." 186 Hayek insists, on the contrary, that
no amount of "rational dialogue" can generate the knowledge requisite to the
accomplishment of such tasks.
First, Hayek contends that the rules that structure liberal society are not the
product of argument and reasoned debate but are determined by the "rationale" 1 87 and
requirements of the liberal "system as a whole" 188 (see Appendices A and Bl. Although
we may debate whether or not we desire to live in a liberal society, once we are
committed to that kind of order, our ohoice of rules is severely circumscribed, for Hayek

believes "there may exist just one way to satisfy certain requirements for forming an
extended order ... " 189 such as modern liberal society.
Second, we do not possess and can not acquire knowledge of the innumerable and
ever-changing facts and circumstances which we would need to know in order to
determine the concrete ends all "ought" to pursue. Regardless of how disinterested, just,
intelligent, and altruistic we all may be, we can never rationally design a non-arbitrary
hierarchy of concrete ends, for the ends that persons "should" pursue 190 depend upon
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concrete facts and circumstances {relative values and scarcities) which no human mind or
group of minds can grasp. 191 "Rational" concrete patterns can only be continually
rediscovered as persons employ their (tacit and explicit) knowledge to adapt to the peculiar
circumstances encountered within their local environments. 192
The crucial fact of our lives is that we are not omniscient, that we
have from moment to moment to adjust ourselves to new facts
which we have not known before, and that we can therefore not
order our lives according to a preconceived detailed plan in which
every particular action is beforehand rationally adjusted to every
other ... Since our whole life consists in facing ever new and
unforeseeable circumstances, we cannot make it orderly by
deciding in advance all the particular actions we shall take
193

Moreover, there exists no general principle by which we may objectively determine
the relative importance of conflicting concrete ends. 194 Hayek argues that no amount of
"rational discussion" can produce agreement on the particular concrete manifestation our
complex social order "should" assume if such agreement is "not already present at the
outset." 196 To compel persons to serve some hierarchical scale of concrete ends in the
name of "rationality" (or for any other reason) can only mean that "common ends are
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imposed upon all that cannot be justified by reason and cannot be more than the [arbitrary]
decisions of particular wills. " 196
Hayek argues, moreover, that all we truly have in common with our fellows in a
Great Society is knowledge of certain abstract features of our social and physical
environment. We share knowledge of the kind of clothing we wear, the kind of food we
eat, the kind of entertainment we enjoy, and so on. 197 Most of the particular facts and
circumstances that determine the concrete shape of our fellows' lives in the spatially
extensive modern liberal order are and must forever remain unknown to us. Abstract rules
prevailed precisely because they served to bypass these epistemological barriers and thus

-

allowed the formation of an extended order that utilizes and coordinates more knowledge
and information than is surveyable or accessible to any individual or group. 198
To ignore these epistemological considerations is, on Hayek's view, to ignore or
misunderstand the "whole rationale" 199 of liberal institutions. "All institutions of freedom
[law, markets, money, morals] are adaptations to [the] fundamental fact of
ignorance, " 200 to the necessary limits of the human mind. If we somehow knew the
"best" 201 concrete manifestation a Good Society would assume, Hayek suggests, the
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case for liberal institutions would vanish. 202 If indeed there existed omniscient entities
who could direct each person's activities toward his own and others' best fulfillment, we
would not require the trial-and-error process whereby we discover the pursuits that fulfill
our values (and what, in fact, those values are). 203 Fulfillment-the good of all- cannot
be planned in the abstract. Only those who have succumbed to the "synoptic delusion"
could, Hayek argues, overlook this fundamental fact. 204

IV.

EVOLUTIONARY OR CRITICAL RATIONALISM

The liberal tradition that Hayek wishes to contrast with the constructivistic tradition
.

ancf that he himself represents is rooted in the Scottish Enlightenment. According to
Hayek, the liberalism he espouses " ... derives from the discovery of a self-generating [or
spontaneous] order in social affairs." 205 Spontaneous-order theory was first elaborated
by thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith and significantly
developed by Carl Menger and his folrowers in the Austrian School. 206 Such theory
endeavors to explain how social order emerges, in Ferguson's famous phrase, as " ... a
result of human action, but not ... of ... human design" 207 -how a stable abstract
pattern of social relations may emerge as the unintended by-product of human interaction.
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In so doing, it explores the significance of the fact that humans are as much rule-governed
as purposive agents and that systematized, explicit, articulated knowledge is but the
"crowning part of [the] edifice" 208 of human knowledge.
This tradition is characterized, moreover, by an evolutionary perspective which
conceives social institutions and practices-law, morals, money, the market mechanism,
habits, language-not as products of conscious construction or enlightened invention but
of a supra-rational trial-and-error process of cultural evolution. From such a perspective,
traditions, customs, and the entire panoply of human convention do not appear as mere
arbitrary and irrational prejudices cavalierly to be abandoned in the quest for rational
-

confrol over social forces. Not only do inherited practices embody a "superindividual
wisdom" 209 acquired through the practical experience of former generations, but, what is
equally important, the observance of many of these nonrational conventions is
indispensable to the formation and maintenance of the social order. 210
Hayek argues, then, that traditional liberal rules 211 and institutions, as well as
reason, abstract thought, and the structure of the mind itself, should be understood as
evolutionary adaptations to certain irremediable circumstances 212 of human existence,
selected, at bottom and over the long run, in accordance with their human survival-value.
However difficult to discern, those traditional values and rules whose observance
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generated modern liberal society serve a function in regard to the maintenance of that kind
of order; and, Hayek believes, we abandon them at the price of civilized order and perhaps
survival itself. 213

As we have mentioned, the conception of reason that Hayek wishes to repudiate is
that which conceives reason as an autonomous faculty standing outside the cosmos of
nature and capable of judging society and human action in general from a "higher point of
view. " 214 Such a conception leads not only to the "synoptic delusion" mentioned
previously, but to certain beliefs regarding the appropriateness of action, beliefs which boil
-

down to the idea that "action, if it is to be rational, must be deliberate and
foresighted. " 215 The Hayekian constructivist, in other words, is convinced that it is
unreasonable to take any action unles.s one "knows what one is doing" -unless one can
consciously identify the purpose of an action and both foresee and desire the
consequences that ensue. Or, as a noted contemporary political theorist puts it, "A
rational being is purposive, deliberate, and autonomous. " 216
For Hayek and his intellectual forebears, on the contrary, man is more "lazy,
improvident, " 217 and "short-sighted ... " 218 than he is rational and purposive. On their
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view, man has been "successful" 219 not because he is rational, but because he is guided
in his actions by evolved rules and practices that supply the want of extensive individual
rationality and foresight. Evolutionary theorists, as we noted, conceive inherited rules and
social institutions as "bearers of ... tacit knowledge, " 220 knowledge which transcends
that available to the conscious reasoning mind, 221 and not, we should note, as
instruments that persons deliberately ·employ to achieve certain desired goals. 222 On
Hayek's view, man does not possess the distance from rules implied by such an
instrumental conception, for, as we have discussed, he conceives mind and personality as

constituted by systems of rules, only some of which enter into explicit reasoning
processes.
Although Hayek is highly critical of the rationalism that seeks to subject all social
phenomena to deliberate rational control, he nevertheless is not a proponent of any sort of
irrationalism; and he gives short shrift to demands of will, instinct, or desire .
. . . (MJy argument is in no way directed against reason properly
used. By reason properly used I mean reason that recognizes its
own limitations and, itself taught by reason, faces the implications
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of the astonishing fact ... that order generated without design can
far outstrip plans men consciously contrive. 223

He considers himself, then, an "evolutionary or critical rationalist" -a person who
recognizes reason to be man's "most precious possession, " 224 yet one with an inherently
limited sphere of authority, which derives, as we have discussed, from inherent limitations
of the human mind: man's "necessary ignorance of the concrete facts that determine the
actions of ... all the ... members of ... society" 226 and the fact that reason
necessarily deals with the mental manipulation of abstractions.
The Hayekian critical rationalist values the exercise of reason in human affairs but,
in

c~ntrast

to the constructivist, he recognizes that reason is not omnipotent-that it is a

tool, not an author, a servant, not a jydge. 226 The critical rationalist recognizes, in
particular, that reason is powerless to either determine an appropriate concrete pattern for
a complex society or consciously regulate or arrange the particular actions of its many
members. He recognizes that the use of abstraction is the means whereby man " ...
achieve[s] at least some degree of order in the complex of social affairs, ... know[ingl it is
impossible to master the full detail, while the constructivist rationalist values abstraction
only as an instrument in determining particulars." 227 "If the Enlightenment had
discovered that the role assigned to human reason in intelligent construction had been too
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small in the past, [the critical rationalist isl discovering that the task which man is
assigning to the rational construction of new institutions is far too big." 228
Hayek, then, allows a rather limited role for human reason in the determination and
positive construction of human experi.ence in general and social institutions in particular.
Moreover, in line with his conception of reason as a faculty that serves a basically negative
function, he is more concerned to identify what reason cannot do than to delineate its
positive capabilities. We shall perhaps gain a clearer understanding of his conception of
reason's appropriate sphere of competence when we examine the method of social
criticism-a method he terms "immanent criticism" -he advances.

On the Method of "Immanent Criticism" 229

Although Hayek insists that inherited values and institutions may not be abandoned
merely because we do not fully comprehend their "purpose" or significance, he does not
believe that "tradition as such is sacred and exempt from criticism. " 230 He argues, in
fact, that we who "endeavor to understand how society functions, and to discover where
it can be improved, must claim the right critically to examine, and even to judge, every
single value of our society." 231 As we noted, his argument is not directed against what
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he considers the proper use of reason but against the "abuse of reason" 232 -the
endeavor to "make everything subject to rational control." 233
If, however, as Hayek claims, inherited traditions embody knowledge which
transcends that available to the conscious reasoning mind, how may we determine when
critical evaluation of social institutions is in order and when it is merely an expression of
rationalistic hubris? The only explicit guidelines Hayek offers are to be found within his
doctrine of "immanent criticism."
Immanent criticism is a " ... sort of criticism that moves within a given system of
rules and judges particular rules in terms of their consistency or compatibility with all other
recognized rules in inducing the formation of a certain kind of order of actions .

n234

. . . [T]hough we must constantly re-examine our rules and be
prepared to question every single one of them, we can always do
so only in terms of their consistency or compatibility with the rest ·
of the system from the angle of their effectiveness in contributing
to the formation of the same kind of overall order of actions which
all the other rules serve. There is room for improvement, but we
cannot redesign but only further evolve what we do not fully
comprehend. . .. 235
All we can do is confront one part [of civilization] with the other
parts ... test each and every value about which doubts are raised
by the standard of other values, which we can assume that our
listeners or readers share with us. 235
[For] ... [i]f we are to make full use of all the experience which has
been transmitted only in the form of traditional rules, all criticism
and efforts at improvement of particular rules must proceed within a
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framework of given values which for the purpose in hand must be
accepted as not requiring justification. 237

On Hayek's view, then, specif.ic aspects of a culture must be judged or critically
appraised only within the context of that culture and not from any transcendental or
universal perspective. 238 For Hayek, there is no such perspective: "The picture of man
as a being who, thanks to his reason, can rise above the values of civilization, in order to
judge it from the outside ... is an illusion. For Hayek, morals, values, and reason are
entirely natural phenomena, evolutionary adaptations which have enabled man to survive
and flourish in his particular kind of world. Those social institutions that have survived the
evolutionary process did so because they serve human needs and because they generate a
superior overall order of activities. 239 Values and moral rules, in other words, serve a
function in regard to the maintenance of a given social order and may not be manipulated
or discarded merely because we may not comprehend their rationale.
Hayek suggests, moreover, that we still have much to learn regarding the
relationship between values, morals, and legal rules, on the one and, and the overall order
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The order to which Hayekian theory refers manifests itself in the matching or coincidence of
plans and expectations across persons who are necessarily ignorant of most of the concrete
circumstances prevailing throughout society and of the concrete aims pursued by their (mostly
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that is the unintended product of their observance, on the other. "We do not really
understand how [our whole moral system] maintains the order of actions on which the coordination of the activities of many millions depends ... And since we owe the order of
our society to a tradition of rules which we only imperfectly understand, all progress must
be based on tradition." 240
Moreover, Hayek attaches great significance to the fact that every person is born
into a given value framework 241 and

a given working social order which no one created

and which no one has the power or authority to alter at will. The fact that the "existing
factual order of society exists only because people accept certain values" 242 limits (both
morally and pragmatically) the extent to which we can deliberately reform or change
existing rules. We are not free to cut a new moral or legal system from whole cloth
because
All rules of conduct serve ... a particular kind of order to society
... [T)hough such a society will find it necessary to enforce its
rules of conduct in order to protect itself against disruption, it is not
society with a given structure that creates the rules appropriate to
it, but the rules which have been practiced by a few and then
imitated by many which created a social order of a particular
kind. 243
... (N]o individual has the power to change [this order)
fundamentally; because such change would require changes in the
rules which other members of the society obey, in part
unconsciously or out of sheer habit, and which, if a viable society
of a different type were io be created, would have to be replaced
by other -rules which nobody has the power to make effective. 244
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Thus the necessity of "immanent criticism" -criticism of "particular rules within
standards set by ... the aggregate structure of well-established rules. " 246

On the Issue of Justification

For Hayek, the rules of morality and justice are the same as they were for David
Hume: conventions that have emerged and endured because they smooth the coordination
of human affairs and are indispensable, given the nature of reality and the circumstances of
human existence, to the effective functioning of society. 246 For Hayek, as for Hume,
neither the "rules of morality [nor the rules of justice] are ... the conclusions of our
reason. " 247
Yet [Hayek argues] Hume's claim has not sufficed to deter most
modern rationalists from continuing to believe ... that something
not derived from reason tnust be either nonsense or a matter for
arbitrary preference, and, accordingly, to continue to demand
rati ona I justifications. . . .
[Yet] nothing is justifiable in the way demanded. Not only is this so
of morals, but also of language and law and even science itself ...
. [N]o matter what rules we follow, we will not be able to justify
them as demanded; so no argument about morals-or science, or
law, or language- can legitimately turn on the issue of justification

The issue of justification is indeed a red herring ... While our moral
traditions cannot be constructed, justified or demonstrated in the
way demanded, their processes of formation can be partially
reconstructed . . . and in doing so we can to some degree
understand the needs that they serve. To the extent we succeed in
this, we are indeed called upon to improve and revise our moral
traditions by remedying recognisable defects by piecemeal
•
improvement based on immanent criticism, that is, by analysing the
compatibility and consistency of their parts, and tinkering with the
system accordingly .... Th[is] 'rational reconstruction' ... of how
the system might have come into being is ... an historical, even
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natural-historical investigation, not an attempt to construct, justify,
or demonstrate the system itself ... It ... resembles what
followers of Hume used to call conjectural history, which tried to
make intelligible why some rules rather than others had prevailed
. . . This is the path taken not only by the Scottish philosophers but
by a long chain of students of cultural evolution, from the classical
Roman grammarians and linguists, to Bernard Mandeville, through
Herder, Giambattista Vico ... von Savigny, and on to Carl
Menger. 248

Hayek's point is that the values and rules whose observance generated advanced
liberal society can not be proved or conclusively demonstrated to be superior to all others.
What he argues is that only one system of rules 249 ("undoubtedly still very imperfect and
capable of much improvement" 260 ) has yet been discovered which can maintain the
"kind of open or 'humanistic' society where each individual counts as an individual and not
only as a member of a particular group, and where therefore universal rules of conduct can
exist which are equally applicable to all responsible beings. Moreover, [i]t is only if we
accept such a universal order as an aim, 261 that is, if we want to continue on the path
which since the ancient Stoics and Christianity has been characteristic of Western
civilization, that we can defend this moral system as superior to others-and at the same
time endeavor to improve it further by continued immanent criticism. " 252
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THREE
CRITICISM AND COMMENTARY

Hayek' s views on the role of reason in human affairs rub against the grain of
certain well-established habits of the mind. Not only do they oppose the dominant
intellectual outlook of the modern era, but their comprehension requires sensitive
attendance to the "tacit dimension" of human experience, 263 a skill at which those
schooled in twentieth-century rationalism and positivism may be somewhat rusty. The
tension generated by the play of rationalistic and anti-rationalistic elements of Hayek's
thought has also led critics to challenge the consistency and coherence of his argument.
We shall conclude our study by examining the arguments of various critics who question
1) the value and meaningfulness of the distinction Hayek draws between the two "kinds of
rationalism"; 2) the consistency or coherence of the position Hayek takes on the role of
reason in human affairs; and 3) whether Hayek's doctrine of "immanent criticism" is
adequate to the task he assigns it. We shall argue that 1) the distinction Hayek draws
between the two kinds of rationalism is meaningful and that certain attitudes toward
reason appear to be related to certain political views; 2) whether Hayek, despite his
criticism of constructivism, should himself be considered a constructivist depends on
whether we adopt a broad or narrow interpretation of constructivism; and 3) Hayek's
method of social criticism does provide the basis for a meaningful critical theory.

First and most generally, it has been suggested that Hayek's entire projectsystematically to articulate a coherent liberal ideology-is as much a product of
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Enlightenment rationalism as the rival constructivistic theories he wishes to refute. As
Michael Oakeshott puts it, "The main significance of Hayek's [work is] not the cogency of
his doctrine, but the fact that it is a doctrine. A plan to resist all planning may be better
than its opposite, but it belongs to th~ same style of [rationalist] politics. " 264
Conservatives of the Oakeshottian persuasion are deeply suspicious of all abstract
theorizing or system building. They argue that persons such as Hayek would impose a
dangerously "rigid" 266 (and constructed) framework on the political process, one that
disparages concrete practice in service of some abstract ideal such as individual liberty or
efficiency. To Oakeshott, Hayekian liberalism, like all "self-conscious ideolog[ies,J" 266 is
merely a cookbook of "techniques" 267 concocted by "reason" -a technical manual, one
may say, for the "politically inexperienced." 266 These remarks were written many years
ago (in 1947, shortly after the publication of The Road to Serfdom and before Hayek had
written extensively in political philosophy), and one wonders whether Oakeshott held the
same view later in his life. 269 For, as several commentators have observed, he and
Hayek had very similar points of view· regarding the nature of the social order and the role
of politics in social life. 260
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Along the same lines but from a different perspective, 261 Brian Lee Crowley
implicitly rejects Hayek's distinction between "evolutionary rationalism" and
constructivism. He argues that Hayekian philosophy lies foursquare within the tradition of
rationalistic liberalism and that the liberal principles he defends are a product of the
speculative and ahistorical rationalism Hayek ostensibly rejects. 262
Contrary to Crowley and other communitarians, however, Hayek claims that
classical liberal doctrine is not a product of ahistorical abstract speculation (as are the
rationalistic contractarian and rights-based doctrines derived from the French tradition) but
of concrete experience and particular historical developments (primarily in England). Hayek
conceives liberal principles as the precipitate of practical experience, preserved and
transmitted because they made possible the growth of an "extended order of human
cooperation" 263 that greatly contributed to human flourishing. He conceives his
endeavor to systematize such principles into a coherent ideology as an effort to identify
and articulate those spontaneously evolved rules whose observance in fact produced the
liberal order, not. as an exercise in rationalistic construction or abstract speculation. 264
Whether or not his self-characterization is accurate depends, of course, on whether the
evolutionary account of the emergence of social institutions is valid.

261 Qne that has been dubbed "anarcho-Aristotelian," David Levy, "Liberalism, Politics and AntiPolitics," Critical Review (Spring 1989): 343.
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I.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CRITICAL RATIONALISM

Several commentators have argued that Hayek's distinction between two "kinds of
rationalism" 266 -the "evolutionary" rationalism he espouses and the "constructivistic"
rationalism he condemns-is of little use or value because the conceptions of
constructivism and critical rationalism are too imprecise and confused to be useful as
explanatory constructs.
Both Chandran l<ukathas 266 and Arthur Diamond 267 suggest that Hayek's
categorization of various thinkers as either constructivist or critical rationalists (see
Appendix CJ is arbitrary. They argue that the distinction he draws between constructivist
and·critical rationalism is "unsound" 268 and of "limited usefulness" 269 because 1)
Hayek "never makes ... clear why some thinkers are constructivists and some not"; 270
and 2) the thinkers he assigns to either category do not in fact hold the "particular
[epistemological and political] positions" 271 by which Hayek allegedly defines the
categories. More specifically, they point out that there appears to be no one-to-one
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271 Diamond maintains that constructivism "as Hayek uses the term ... refers to particular
positions on each of three distinct levels of discourse: epistemology, ethics, and politics ... "
(Diamond, 240). We shall confine our discussion to Hayek's views on the relation between
epistemology and politics. We have not examined his ethical position in any depth. To do so now
would make an already-too-long essay even more cumbersome.
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correspondence between a belief in spontaneous evolutionary processes and liberal politics,
on the one hand, or, on the other, a belief in a design theory of institutions and illiberal
politics. I shall argue that criticism one is, to some extent, valid but that criticism two is
misconceived. Hayek does not define constructivism in terms of explicit adherence to
"particular positions."
To illustrate the above contentions, these critics point out that Marx, perhaps
Hayek's prototypical constructivist th\nker, " ... certainly did not believe that all human
society was the result of conscious design [according to Hayek, the false assumption
underlying constructivistic politics]. Indeed, one of the main features of [Marx's] system
was the necessary historical evolution of human institutions [a view Hayek generally
associates with critical rationalism and liberal politics]." 272
They further argue that Locke and l<ant, like Hobbes and Rousseau, subscribed to a
variant of social-contract theory (contractarianism is, for Hayek, a form of constructivism),
yet Hayek is willing to assign the former pair to the preferred liberal category, while
roundly condemning the latter as constructivists. 273 Lord Robbins has a similar
complaint. 274 Although he is generally sympathetic towards Hayek's views, he objects
to the fact that Hayek classifies Jeremy Bentham as an illiberal constructivist. The
confusion seems endless. Only one thing is clear: Hayek has succeeded in giving
constructivism a bad name. No one, apparently, wants to put their favored theorist in that
camp. Let us examine whether Hayek' s classificatory scheme really is as confused and
ambiguous as these critics suggest.
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In my opinion, the above critics do not grasp the import of Hayek's distinction
between constructivist and critical rationalism; he does not define constructivism as
adherence to any "particular positions. " 276 The constructivist/critical rationalist
categories should be conceived as "ideal types" that represent tendencies, propensities,
and dispositions-general "manner[s] of thinking" 276 that may or may not crystalize into
sharply delineated or explicit positions in epistemology or politics.
I suggest, then, that constructivism (a kind of rationalism) should be understood as
a term that represents a complex of related attitudes, not simply the explicit "position" that
social institutions were literally invented or designed. It refers to a broad and highly
abstract category that encompasses a wide range of intellectual inclinations and explicit

and implicit views: the general ideas that only social phenomena whose purpose is
accessible to the reasoning intellect deserve our approval; that the conscious mind can
successfully control and co-ordinate social processes; that reason, by itself, can determine
values and ends; and so on.
Moreover, actual thought is never black (constructivism) or white (critical
rationalism) but will exhibit shades of gray. 277 It seems to me that everyone born over
the past several centuries will exhibit "constructivist" tendencies if, as Hayek contends,
our manner of thinking is a product of social experience. Cartesian conceptions have
predominated in intellectual and social affairs throughout the modern era, embedded,
however, in that nonrational matrix of traditional rules and spontaneous processes to

275 "The

core of ... the constructivistic type of liberalism ... was not so much a definite political
doctrine as a general mental attitude .... " "Liberalism," New Studies, 120.
276 "The

Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 3.

277 Hayek does not conceive constructivism as the opposite of critical rationalism but as an
"illegitimate and erroneous exaggeration of a characteristic element [i.e. rationalism] of the European
tradition." "Kind of Rationalism," Studies, 93.
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which Hayek has drawn our attention. No one whose mind has been shaped in that mileau
could be either a "pure" constructivist" or a purely "critical rationalist." Even Hayek, as we
shall discuss, may not fit neatly into either category.
Furthermore, we should recall Hayek's views on the nature of abstraction and the
classificatory mechanism that is the mind. Man perceives because his mind is operated by
rules which classify phenomena according to certain highly abstract aspects. The
simultaneous operation of many such rules, some of which may not have explicitly entered
the conscious reasoning process, results in precise specification. Hayek would not claim
exhaustively to have described all the rules ("particular positions") that govern the
constructivist/critical rationalist categories-he would not have considered this possible or
regarded his explicit statements on the attributes of constructivistic thought as the final
word. In line with his evolutionary epistemology, then, we can expect a more and more
precise articulation of the rules that govern the categories to emerge over time.
Nevertheless, as the above criticisms reveal, Hayek has not in fact clearly
articulated the distinction he has in mind. I would like to suggest, however, that, although
Hayek never explicitly says so, there do exist "defining attributes" of constructivism and
critical rationalism that render his classificatory schemata meaningful and consistent. I
submit that certain attitudes toward abstractness and reason's ability to determine and
consciously regulate the concrete particulars of social life lie at the core of the
constructivist/critical rationalism distinction. Whatever other views they may hold, I would
argue that Hayekian constructivists refuse to recognize that reason cannot "transcend the
realm of the abstract" 278 or consciously manipulate the particular aspects of a complex
social order to good effect. They do not recognize that abstraction is the means whereby
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man overcomes his constitutional inability to grasp the infinite complexity of concrete
reality. Constructivists (implicitly) believe that, regardless of how we may have reached
our present position, whether through evolution or design, Reason is today capable of
straightening out that heretofore haphazard path and of determining both an appropriate

concrete pattern for present society and the most desirable particular path of social
evolution. 279
It seems to me, then, that Hayek's "kinds of rationalism" are related to (but not
defined by) certain political "positions" in the following manner: Constructivists are "not
content with abstraction"; 280 they do not recognize that reason is incapable of designing
a non-arbitrary concrete pattern for a complex society or of consciously co-ordinating or
arranging the particular affairs of its members. They thus tend to subscribe to illiberal (in
the Hayekian sense) political views that endorse the use of legislation (for Hayek,
legislation is always a conscious construction) to manipulate and override the concrete
pattern that emerges as a result of the spontaneous social process. Critical rationalists, on
the other hand, recognize (perhaps only implicitly) that reason can only deal in abstractions
and are thus led to embrace the classical-liberal commitment to abstract principle and the
rule of law (as Hayek conceives it). 281 I submit that this is the key to understanding
Hayek's views on the relationship between epistemology and politics.
Why, for instance, would Hayek label Kant a liberal even though Kant certainly
believed that reason was an autonomous faculty capable of "guid[ing] moral conduct, " 282
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an attitude Hayek generally condemns as constructivistic? Because Kant reached what
Hayek considers the "right conclusion" -that rules of law must be abstract and
general-because he recognized that "welfare has no principle," 283 that reason is unable,
by itself, to determine concrete particulars. The same argument explains Hayek's favorable
attitude toward Locke. Despite his apparent contractarianism, 284 Locke came to the
right-liberal-conclusions regarding the attributes of law. Bentham, however, despite his
professed liberalism, believed that general rules or abstract principles could be overridden
by particular legislation in service of the greatest good. 286
Marx, on the other hand, may have recognized that evolutionary processes
operated in the past, but he certainly believed that Reason should and could henceforth
direct those processes in detail. He and his followers aimed to " ... to bring all production
under ... conscious purposive ordering ... to consciously regulate ... the life process of
society ... in accordance with a settled plan. " 286 Moreover, he implicitly claimed the
ability to stand outside history, to identify the "necessary" path of human evolution and to

283 1mmanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings, ed, H. Reiss, trs, H. B. Nisbett (Cambridge, 1970),

183; cited in The Fatal Conceit, 75.
284Which he probably· employed as a polemical device anyway
2a5Moreover, to believe, as Bentham and other utilitarians did, that one can measure (and even
quantify!) the particular consequences of action is the height of constructivistic illusion. We cannot
know but a fragment of the effects or extended ramifications of our actions in a modern extended
order. This, for Hayek, is one of the reasons we follow rules. "The trouble with the whole utilitarian
approach is that ... it completely eliminates the factor which makes rules necessary, namely our
ignorance. It has indeed always amazed me how serious and intelligent men, as the utilitarians
undoubtedly were, ... could have proposed a theory which presupposes a knowledge of the
particular effects of our individual actions when in fact the whole existence of the phenomenon they
set out to explain, namely of a system of rules of conduct, was due to the impossibility of such
knowledge." Mirage, 20.
2a 6 Karl Marx, cited in Kukathas, 11 .
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foresee its future course. He claimed access to the "synoptic" vision-according to Hayek,
the "characteristic error" 287 of the constructivist.
I submit, then, that Hayekian constructivism, at bottom, is a turn of mind that
believes itself able, through the exercise of Reason, to construct a coherent overall order
from "knowledge of the [concrete] particulars. " 288 It may be associated with certain
explicit views regarding the origin of institutions, but this may not be its defining attribute.
Both Diamond and Kukathas have shown there is no one-to-one correspondence between
an explicit belief in design theory and illiberal politics.

If we interpret constructivism,

however, as an attitude toward the relationship between reason and the concrete and
corresponding beliefs regarding the type of rules government should enforce (general or
particular). then I believe Hayek's classification is meaningful and not inconsistent.
Kukathas may be correct, however, when he points out that Hayek has not shown
that illiberal politics are necessarily related to an explicit belief in the design theory of social
institutions. 289 Hayek claims that "if constructivist rationalism can be shown to be
based on factually false assumptions [especially, the assumption that social institutions
were deliberately designed]. a whole family of schools of scientific as well as political
thought will also be proved erroneous. " 290 I do not think Hayek meant to imply that
constructivists hold such a belief consciously and explicitly; it is merely implicit in their
general views. Hayek should have made it clear, however, that constructivists act "as if"
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they believed in design theory; as it stands, one cannot accept his claim without
qualification.

//. Is

HAYEK A CONSTRUCTIVIST RATIONAL/ST?

A second major criticism directed at Hayek's position on the role of reason
concerns the issue of consistency: Hayek is accused of practicing the very constructivism
against which he preaches. One of the more obvious reasons for this charge is that Hayek
has "rationally constructed" a detailed model Constitution that embodies his political
doctrines and "corrects" the flaws he perceives in the institutional arrangements prevailing

-

in the Western democracies. 291 This endeavor appears to some commentators as
unmistakable evidence of the "constructivist turn" 292 in Hayek's thought. Kukathas, for
instance, views Hayek's exercise in constitutional design as an attempt to "construct the
principles we need when we try to replace our existing (spontaneously evolved)

institutions" 293 (italics mine). If Hayek is indeed endeavoring to "construct [that is, to
invent or deliberately design] principles [laws, general rules] to replace our spontaneously
evolved institutions," we have every reason to accuse him of egregious inconsistency and

outright incoherence, for this is precisely the constructivistic aim he explicitly condemns.
Is this, however, an accurate description of Hayek's endeavor? Here is how Hayek
describes his effort:
What I have been trying to sketch in these volumes ... has been a
guide out of the process of degeneration of the existing form of
government, and to construct an intellectual emergency equipment
which will be available when we have no choice but to replace the

291 Political Order of a Free People, 98-119.
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tottering structure by some better edifice than resort in despair to
some sort of dictatorial regime. Government is necessarily the
product of intellectual design. If we can give it a shape in which it
provides a beneficial framework for the free growth of society
without giving to any one power to control this growth in the
particular, we may well hope to see the growth of civilization
continue. 294

We note that Hayek's aim is to "construct an intellectual emergency equipment"
(that is, a blueprint for a new Constitution), not, we emphasize, to construct new
principles (laws, general rules). Hayek does not conceive a society's Constitution as an

articulation of law, but as a "superstrlJcture" 296 erected to enforce the pre-existing,
spontaneously evolved rules of just conduct. Government (the organization established by
a Constitution), for Hayek, "is necessarily the product of intellectual design," a
deliberately constructed entity created to achieve particular purposes (see Appendix A). It
is not, on his view, a "spontaneously evolved" institution like law or moral and political
principles, the view Kukathas imputes to Hayek. There is all the difference in the world
between reconstructing a previously constructed organization, and "constructing"
(inventing, consciously designing) principles, laws, or general rules, the possibility of
which Hayek explicitly and emphatically denies. His argument, as we have discussed, is
that the abstract rules and principles whose observance generated modern liberal society
spontaneously emerged throughout a gradual process of cultural evolution. No one,
Hayek maintains, invented or constructed such rules. Two of his fundamental concerns
were to explain why the endeavor rationally to construct new legal or moral principles is
misguided and to explicate the nonrational origin of law and morals.
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Norman Barry 296 has also eval.uated Hayek's exercise in constitutional
construction. He, however, reaches a conclusion opposite to Kukathas's: like James
Buchanan, 297 he faults Hayek for placing too much confidence in evolutionary processes
and not enough in the constructive powers of reason. On Barry's view, Hayek fails to
recognize the improvement that may be gained by endeavoring consciously to reconstruct
contemporary liberal Constitutions: " ... [T]he mistake in some evolutionist thought,
including Hayek's, is to condemn all forms of constitutional design, ... when in fact
sophisticated versions of it provide a foundation for the liberal order at least as persuasive
as Hayek' s. " 298 Barry also points out, in my view rightly, that Hayek' s constitutional
.....

and political "reforms, radical though they sound, are quite consistent with his ... nonrationalist ... epistemology ... [and with] the principles of traditional liberalism as Hayek
understands them. " 299 Hayek's Cons~itution, he suggests, should be conceived as a
"metaphor ... designed to alert the reader to mistaken constitutional forms and to show
how critical reason can be used to correct them. " 300
We conclude, then, that Hayek's exercise in constitutional construction is not
inconsistent with his anti-constructivism and anti-rationalism. Nevertheless, there are
other reasons to believe that Hayek may be guilty of practicing (or at least endorsing) the
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constructivism he condemns. R. A. Arnold 301 offers one of the more convincing
arguments in support of such a view although, as we shall discuss below, none of
Hayek's critics seem to have noticed what I consider the most conclusive evidence of
Hayek's constructivistic aspirations. First, however, let us review Arnold's argument.
Arnold not only perceives a constructivistic impulse impelling Hayek's thought but
argues that Hayek's position "is not, Qt base, a commendation of the evolutionary process,
... [but is actually] ... a successful attempt at [what Arnold terms] non-teleological
construction. " 302 The "only meaningful way to view evolution, " 303 he maintains, is as
a process that 1) occurs within an "unspecified environment" 304 and 2) generates
-

completely undetermined outcomes. According to Arnold, however, the Hayekian
evolutionary process occurs within a specified environment-a legal framework that
consists of general, abstract rules. Moreover, a Hayekian order would not exhibit
completely undetermined outcomes; although it "does not guarantee an 'end' or 'endstate,' ... it bounds or limits the range of 'ends' or 'end-states' that may come
about." 306 As such, it should be considered an example of "non-teleological
construction," and Hayek, " ... in no contradiction of terms, [should be considered] an
antirational, non-teleological constructivist. " 306
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Arnold recognizes that his argument only holds if the general rules requisite to the
emergence of the Hayekian order have not themselves spontaneously emerged. He argues,
however, that although "it is not impossible that general rules would emerge, ... simple
observation is evidence that they do not exist at present. " 307 He notes that the
observance of abstract rules depends critically upon the moral code honored by the people.
More particularly, it requires one that places abstract justice over concrete loyalty to one's
group. Since this moral code is no longer widely embraced (according to Arnold), the
Hayekian order could only be brought into being by instituting a constructed legal
framework.
This is a perceptive and interesting argument, but I do not think Arnold's
characterization of Hayek's position is completely accurate. To Arnold, the fact that
"general rules ... do not exist at present" apparently demonstrates that the Hayekian
order could only be induced by deliberate design and that Hayek is not "at base" an
evolutionary theorist.
First, Hayek maintains that the abstract legal framework that generated the
spontaneous order of liberal society has in fact emerged via an evolutionary process, not
merely that general rules "would emerge" given the proper moral code. More specifically,
he claims it emerged as a consequence of the gradual spatial extension of the territory
governed by a single legal code. 308 Though the observance of abstract rules was no
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Hayek argues that in a small face-to-face society, each member can know both the needs of his
fellows and the effects of his actions and·will, therefore, generally be obligated to render assistance in
case of need. As the spatial range governed by a particular legal code expands, however, to include
persons who neither share nor are even aware of the same concrete circumstances and ends of one's
own group, the "enforceable duty to aim at the well-being of the other members of the ... group"
(Mirage, 146) becomes incapable of fulfillment. One's legal obligations toward one's fellows
necessarily become increasingly abstract and negative. In other words, Hayek claims that the moral
progress that accompanied the transition from the Tribal Society to the Great or Open Society-the
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doubt never universal, even within the liberal order, the ideal of universal justice certainly
guided the development of law and was honored to the extent that it permitted the liberal
order to emerge and theorists to identify the nature and function of its underlying legal
principles. 309
Moreover, the fact that general rules "do not exist at present" does not disprove
Hayek's contention that evolved legal systems tend to converge toward the abstract
framework he has described, 310 for Hayek argues that the corruption of the legal
framework has not been due to spontaneous processes or to a genuine abandonment of
traditional liberal values (including a belief in universal justice), 311 but to excessive and
misguided legislation (that is, to coercive intervention in the development of law). 312 We
do not know what our legal framework would look like in the absence of such
intervention. 313
On the other hand, Hayek has also argued that we can and should deliberately aim
to establish the abstract legal framework necessary for the operation of spontaneous
ordering processes. If we purposefully institute such a legal framework with the specific

extension of the obligation to treat every other person by the same moral rules " ... rather than as
either a known friend or an enemy-require[d) a reduction of the range of duties we owe to all others"
(Ibid, 90). "When we can no longer know the others or the circumstances under which they live,
[positive duties] become a ... psychological and intellectual impossibility" (Ibid, 146).
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intention of creating a spontaneous social order, then it seems to me that this would
qualify, as Arnold claims, as an act of "non-teleological construction." And Hayek does
suggest that such a conscious and deliberate approach may today be indispensable to the
preservation of liberal society. 314 I believe Arnold has a point.
As I mentioned earlier, however, none of Hayek's critics, to my knowledge, have
drawn attention to what I believe is the clearest evidence of Hayek's latent constructivistic
intent. "It is possible," Hayek claims, "that an order which would still have to be described
as spontaneous rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate design. " 315
Although he does not, of course, believe that the liberal order is historically the result of
sucti design, he does suggest that the deliberate construction of a spontaneous social order
is "at least conceivable. " 316
It seems to me that Hayek's suggestion that we can deliberately construct a
spontaneous social order flatly contradicts his views regarding the evolutionary emergence
and necessary coherence of law, morals, and values. 317 If, as Hayek claims, the social
structure of a given society emerges as an unintended consequence of the perception,
values, and behavior of the populace, then deliberately to manipulate that structure by
imposing the abstract legal framework requisite to the operation of a spontaneous social
order must destroy whatever working order previously existed and violate the endogenous
values that grew it. 318 it is one thing to argue that we who have inherited liberal
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institutions and values must recognize their function and allow our rational insight to guide
the development of law and public policy. It is quite another, however, to suggest that
liberal rules can be deliberately

institu~ed

in a society that has not spontaneously evolved

those rules and values. 319 Would this not involve an attempt consciously to reconstruct
whatever working order existed prior to the establishment of the framework of rules
requisite to the formation of a spontaneous order?
I simply do not see how this can be reconciled with Hayek's evolutionary account
of the emergence and growth of social institutions. If we interpret constructivism broadly
as the endeavor rationally to design or consciously to build a working social order, then
...

Hayek must plead guilty to inconsistency. The only possible defense he could offer is that
the rules that comprise the abstract framework were not themselves constructed by
reason. Nevertheless, unless those rules cohere with the values and practices of the
populace, their implementation would represent, to my mind, a constructed imposition.

II/. ON

THE METHOD OF IMMANENT CRITICISM

It has been argued that Hayek's distinction between constructivism and critical
rationalism is unhelpful because he offers insufficient criteria by which we may determine
when it is and is not legitimate to subject existing institutions and practices to rational
scrutiny. 320 It has also been suggested that Hayek's "anti-rationalism is so strong that it
virtually disables him from that critical rationalism which is essential for the appraisal of
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particular traditions. " 321 How are we to know when social criticism is in order and when
it is a dangerous expression of constructivistic arrogance? How are we to know whether
oppressive customs serve a function inaccessible to reason yet indispensable to the
preservation of a particular social order?

Hayek seems to justify even the most morally

repugnant practices merely on the grounds that they have heretofore survived the process
of cultural evolution. He seems, to some critics, to have no critical theory at all. 322
On Hayek's view, however, "recognizing that rules tend to be selected, via
competition, on the basis of their hurT)an survival-value, certainly does not protect those
rules from critical scrutiny. " 323 As we have mentioned, he believes we can and should
subject "each and every" 324 value, rule, and practice to the most searching rational
examination. What he denies is that we can simultaneously criticize all our inherited
institutions or judge our civilization as a whole (from what perspective?). Not only "could
[we] not live among other people [without] accept[ing] countless traditions without even
thinking about them, ... " 325 but such absolute doubt would result in the destruction of
the existing social order which, on Hayek's view, no one has the authority to bring
about. 326
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Hayek does not disparage social criticism. All he is saying is that because "we
must always work inside a framework of both values and institutions which is not of our
own making, " 327 we can only evaluate or judge present practices and institutions in
terms of the values and rules which engendered and maintain that civilization: "The only
standard by which we can judge particular values of our society is the entire body of other
values of that same society .... " 328 As Barry puts it, "Hayek is not saying that we
should accept any rules, regardless of what they are ... [H]e insists that we ought not to
reject an aggregate structure of well-established rules, but this does not prevent us from
criticizing particular rules within standards set by that structure. " 329
As we discussed previously, Hayek believes that "the aim of jurisdiction is the
maintenance of an ongoing order of actions." 330 It seems to me that Hayek conceives
the task of the critic as similar in certain respects to that of the judge: both must endeavor
to weed out and reconcile conflicting and contradictory rules, to bring consistency into the
accepted body of inherited values and rules. 331 Moreover, the "touchstone for [such]
evaluation, ... [is the] ... factually existing, but always imperfect, order of actions" 332
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"As in all other fields advance is here [in the development of legal rules] achieved by our moving
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'immanent criticism.' to make the whole more consistent both internally as well as with the facts to
which the rules are applied. Such 'immanent criticism' is the main instrument of the evolution of
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distinguished from the constructivist (or naive) rationalism." Rules and Order, 118.
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of the society as a whole. "Only when it is clearly recognized that the order of actions is a
factual state of affairs distinct from the rules which contribute to its formation can it be
understood that such an abstract order can be the aim of the rules of conduct. " 333
For Hayek and classical liberals in general, then, the abstract order which is
generated by the observance of certain rules and practices is a distinct, objective structure
with discernable characteristics and attributes. 334 Such an undesigned order emerges as
an unintended result of the "whole co.mplex of rules which in fact are observed in a given
society, ... [a complex of rules which] ... determines what particular rule it will be
rational to enforce or which ought to be enforced. " 336 The critic of Western liberal
society, like the judge, must evaluate existing rules and practices in light of their
consistency or compatibility with the rules and values both presupposed by and explicitly
observed in the kind of social order that is liberal society (see Appendices A and 8).
Furthermore, Hayek's critics often write as if criticism were an exclusively
intellectual affair. Formal critical theory, however, is an articulation of practices (as such,
more the tail-end than the head of the process). Social criticism, especially for thinkers
such as Hayek who place great significance on tacit and practical knowledge, learning
through imitation and example, and so on, takes place on many levefs. 336 Persons who
reject particular conventions, who pursue non-traditional careers, who practice nonWestern medical arts, to name merely a few possibilities, are all engaged in social criticism
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Rules and Order, 114. See Appendix A for a discussion of the character of the abstract order to
which Hayekian theory refers.
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" Experience comes to man in many more forms than are commonly supposed by the
professional experimenter or the seeker after explicit knowledge." Constitution, 64.
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though they may never have put pen

~o

paper or expressed their beliefs in words. A free

society instantiates the highest degree of social criticism.
It is not insignificant, then, that members of liberal society are free to criticize (both
explicitly and implicitly) established customs and conventions, to challenge their authority,
and to flout convention if willing to bear possible social sanction. Change occurs, from the
Hayekian standpoint, by the gradual acceptance of practices and beliefs first adopted by
the few and then emulated by the many. 337 Moreover, for Hayek, the law should only
consist of those rules indispensable to the maintenance of the social order and not those
which merely prevent practices objectionable to the majority. 338 Hayek wishes severely
to circumscribe the coercive power precisely because he is concerned not to preclude
spontaneous experimentation with new rules and practices.
None of [my] conclusions are arguments against the use of reason
but only arguments against such uses as require any exclusive and
monopolistic power to experiment in a particular field-power which
brooks no alternative and which lays a claim to the possession of
superior wisdom-and against the consequent preclusion of
solutions better than the ones to which those in power have
committed themselves. 339

As Hayek sees it, then, persons or groups should be free to experiment with
different (non-compulsory) rules and practices. If these do represent an advance over
previous practices, others will emulate them, and they will spread via natural selection; if
they do not, the entire. society will not fall, just those groups that observed what proved to
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be maladaptive rules, values, or practices. 340 This, Hayek argues, is how the process of
cultural evolution operates.
Hayek, it is true, does not offer hard and fast rational criteria by which we may
distinguish the merely oppressive from the functionally essential, but he would deny that
we can possess such an abstract "cookbook of techniques." Indeed, it is precisely
because the reasoning intellect cannot always discern the value of inherited practices that
we need liberty and freedom of action. Their value must be determined by the practical
success or failure of those who follow them. "Cultural selection is not a rational process;
it is not guided by but it creates reason. " 341
On the other hand, a Hayekian order would undoubtedly exhibit strong conservative
tendencies, a bias toward slow growth and away from exogenously imposed change.
Certain critics suggest that this conservative bias is inconsistent with the progressive
liberalism Hayek also advances. 342 For all his emphasis on the significance of tradition,
however, Hayek himself is not much of a traditionalist in a conservative sense. As Norman
Barry points out, he "really is interested in only one tradition, the tradition of spontaneous
evolution. . .. " 343

IV.

CONCLUSION

As we have mentioned, several of Hayek's critics are disturbed by the undeniable
tension generated by the play of rationalistic and anti-rationalistic elements in his thought.
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On the one hand, Hayek wishes to offer a reasoned argument in support of the classicalliberal order; yet he denies, on the other, that reason is capable of "giv[ing] a deductively
sound justification" 344 for either morals, values, or political principles ("moral rules for
collective action"). The highly limited role Hayek assigns to reason, in short, seems to tell
against his own endeavor to provide reasons why we should support a classical-liberal
social order. As one critic has put the issue: "[Gliven his view of the limited role reason
can play in social life, how is it possible [for Hayek] to mount a systematic defence of
liberalism without falling victim to the very kinds of rationalism he criticizes?" 346 The
same critic even suggests that Hayek's views on reason are incoherent, 346 in that they
are.informed by two "philosophically incompatible" 347 presuppositions regarding the role
of reason in human affairs: 1) the "Humean" assumption that "the very idea of
philosophical justification of political principles is questionable at best" ; 348 and 2) the
"Kantian" assumption that "insists on the importance of rational justification .... " 349
On this view, Hayek has put himself in the absurd position of seeking to do something that
he himself considers impossible-namely to provide a rational justification for classical
liberal political principles. 360
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Although an examination of the alleged incoherence generated by Hayek's simultaneous
subscription to "philosophically incompatible" presuppositions regarding the role of reasor:i would lead
us too far afield from our topic, we should note that, in our opinion, Kukathas's interpretation of
Hayek is flawed. Kukathas, following Gray, argues that Hayekian philosophy is thoroughly imbued
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Can such tensions and paradoxes be resolved or do Hayek's rational arguments in
defense of the liberal order constitute the constructivism he condemns in other thinkers?
We shall argue that whether one should fault Hayek for inconsistently employing the "kind
of rationalism" he simultaneously rejects depends on two factors: 1) whether one adopts a
broad or narrow interpretation of constructivism; and 2) whether one conceives rational
argument and explanation as identical to rational justification.
If one interprets constructivism broadly as an effort to employ reason in the
deliberate design and construction of social institutions, then, as we have argued above,
Hayek appears to be guilty of endorsing, if not practicing, the constructivism he condemns.
Even to suggest that a framework of liberal rules could be deliberately instituted in a nonliberal society smacks of constructivism.
On the other hand, if we interpret constructivism narrowly, then Hayek's position is
consistent. The Hayekian constructivist is a person who does not recognize that reason is
incapable of designing an appropriate concrete pattern for a complex society or of
consciously co-ordinating the particular relations among its numerous members. He is thus
led to violate the rule of law as Hayek understands it and to employ legislation in order to
override the concrete pattern that emerges from the spontaneous social process. As I have
tried to show, the thinkers Hayek labels as constructivist believed that reason could
(somehow) consciously manipulate the particular aspects of the social order to good effect.
Those he places in the critical-rationalist category, by contrast, acknowledged the

with Kantian (and thus constructivistic) presuppositions which stand in irreconcilable opposition to his
Humean skepticism regarding the capacity of reason to provide justification for political and moral
principles. As the Humean scholar Donald Livingstone points out, however, "Kukathas makes ... too
much of Hayek's Kantian heritage .... [T]he idiom in which Hayek's philosophy is cast is
overwhelmingly Humean" (Livingstone, 172, 159). I think it can be shown that Hayek is no Kantian
and that "[w]hatever difficulties Hayek's thought may contain, the incoherence Kukathas identifies is
not one of them" (Ibid, 159).

89
indispensability of guidance by abstract principles and believed that valid law consists of
general and abstract prohibitions, not positive prescriptions (see Appendices 8 and C).
We also conclude, however, that Hayek has not spelled out the defining attributes
of constructivist and critical rationalism as clearly as he could have. This has led to a
certain degree of confusion. Moreover, he has left himself open to the charge that he has
not always practiced what he preached. Nevertheless, there is no fundamental
incoherence in his position. Constructivists believe they can build a desirable social order
from "knowledge of the particulars, " 361 a dream which holds no fascination for Hayek.
Although not a constructivist, Hayek is, however, a rationalist-a critical rationalist who
-

.

believes that the intelligent use of reason requires a sober assessment of its sphere of
competence.
Hayek's endeavor to provide reasons in support of the classical liberal order does
not mean that he has "fallen victim to the kinds of rationalism" he decries. The character
of Hayek's rationalism appears, to a certain extent, to be in the eyes of the beholder.

If

one believes that any endeavor to provide rational arguments (or "reasons") in support of
the liberal order is the mark of a "constructivist rationalist," then, of course one will
perceive Hayek as a constructivist. This, however, is not Hayek's own understanding, and
the arguments he employs are entirely consistent with his own understanding of the proper
use of reason in critical inquiry. As we have stressed throughout this study, Hayek
considers himself a "critical rationalist," one who respects the role of reason in human
affairs, but nevertheless recognizes that reason is but one of many social tools man
employs in service of his values and purposes. Recognizing the limits to the use of this
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tool is certainly the mark of a rationalist ("[i)ndeed it is the height of rationality" 362 ), but
not of a constructivist as Hayek understands that concept.
In the last analysis, those wh<? perceive an objectionably rationalist stance
underlying Hayek's thought apparently do not acknowledge his distinction between reason
in the sense of rational insight and a rationalistic "abuse of reason." Hayek certainly
presents rational considerations that he hopes will commend allegiance to traditional liberal
rules and values. Nevertheless, he insists that we accept certain rules and conventions
despite the facts that they have not been rationally designed to achieve known results,
that we cannot prove their validity, and that we may not be able rationally to discern their
significance. That, for Hayek, is the present state of our knowledge.
I believe, however, that there is a distinction between providing a reasonable
explanation of the function served by historically evolved social institutions (Hayek's selfcharacterization of his project) and providing a rational justification 363 for them. Even
Kukathas recognizes that, in the end, Hayek offers an "explanation of the role or function
of rules in the preservation of a social order but not a justification of any particular set of
rules, " 364 that he, like Hume, offers an "anthropology of morals rather than a moral
philosophy. " 366
In this he is correct, for, as we have seen, Hayek explicitly denies the possibility
that inherited values, rules, and practices can be rationally justified. 366 On Hayek's view,
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the issue of justification is an outworn inheritance from the Enlightenment, an aspect of
the antiquated, "obsolete, " 367 and discredited methodology of the Cartesian school. 368
It seems to me that those critics who do not recognize a distinction between explanation
and justification may be so steeped in Cartesian presuppositions that they believe Hayek
must, despite his explicit disavowal, be searching for a rational justification of liberal
rules. 369 Explanation is not justification, but, on Hayek' s view, it is the most we can
achieve.
The whole issue of justificatioh, it seems to me, represents a deeper, spiritual,
dilemma. Those who demand rational or moral justification of liberal values are apparently
searching for a justification for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. On what grounds
are we entitled to live, to be free, to seek fulfillment? Surely it is more than a coincidence
that the rise of Cartesian rationalism was accompanied by a decline in religious faith and an
overt hostility toward the religious and spiritual dimensions of human existence. The
demand for rational justification of liberal values and institutions is, on my view, the mark
of those who have lost their spiritual bearings, who believe that fife, on its face, is not selfevidently good and that it must, therefore, be justified. For an evolutionary naturalist such
as Hayek, however, life does not require justification: "life has no purpose but itself. " 360
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Livingstone notes, "Throughout the study Kukathas [who accuses Hayek of inconsistently
employing the "kinds of rationalism" he repudiates) seems to presuppose the validity of the
constructivist stance or at least of a conception of reason that is incompatible with Hayek's. But that
conception is never spelled out, and there is no attempt to refute Hayek's conception. Kukathas's
frequent claims that Hayek contradicts himself amount to little more than denials of his teachings
which beg the question." Livingstone, 171.
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He does not seek to justify liberal society, but to explain how it has come into being and
the functions and needs served by its values and institutions.
It seems to me that Donald Livingstone has seen more clearly than most of Hayek's
critics into the heart of this matter. Livingstone points out that inhabitants of liberal
society do not hold liberal values inviolable because they can rationally justify them or
prove their validity or because rational considerations compel their commitment. We do
not need to speculate about the theoretical value of liberty, tolerance, the rule of law, and
so on-we have direct, concrete experience and knowledge of such value. Hayek's
project, then, should be understood as an endeavor to bring this direct, if tacit, knowledge
to conscious awareness:
Hayek's political philosophy should be read as an eloquent speech .
. . (that is, ... speech that comprehends the whole of the topic at
hand and ... which raises to awareness the whole of the tacit
dimension) ... in the modern liberal tradition addressed to
participants who have ... experienced the fruits of liberal regimes .
. . Participants do not seek to "justify" liberal regimes. They have
lived through and found them to be good. They know this through
participation not through speculation ... Hayek, unlike most liberal
theorists, never tries to justify liberal practice ... His political
phHosophy is a speech telling us what liberty is and reminding us of
who we are .... 361

Liberal values and principles cannot be rationally justified or conclusively
demonstrated to be superior to non-liberal values and institutions. Nevertheless, Hayek
observes, we preserve.our culture an~ civilization by treating them as if they are in fact
superior to all others.
In this regard, Gray may be correct that Hayek's argument "can have no
justificatory force for anyone who is not already in some measure attached to the ...
historically specific political tradition" 362 Hayek defends. Hayek would have no quarrel
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with that. Is it really true, however, that "no sort of reasoning can bring about unity
among exponents of rival political and moral traditions, " 363 that Hayek only speaks to
those already committed to his version of liberalism? Hayek himself believed otherwise.
For Hayek, the skeptical "anti-rationalist," had more faith in reason than implied by such a
pessimistic pronouncement.

363(bid.

APPENDIX A
ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SPONTANEOUS ORDER AND AN ORGANIZATION

Liberal Society is a Spontaneous Order
According to Hayek, Western liberal society is the unintended outcome of the
widespread observance of certain nonrational traditions-certain rules, practices, and
values which were not observed because anyone foresaw the consequences that would
ensue, but which prevailed because those groups who observed them unwittingly
generated a superior overall order 364 of activities that enabled them to proliferate and
flourish. Once this order had come into existence, however, it was possible retrospectively
to investigate its structure and principles of operation. The result of these investigations
was the formulation of what Hayek terms the theory of spontaneous order.
A spontaneous order is a self-generating or self-maintaining order, an abstract
pattern (system, structure) of stable and predictable relations 365 which emerges as an
unintended consequence of the regularity or rule-governed behavior of the individual
elements that form the abstract order. 366

364
Hayek defines the concept of order as "a state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of
various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial
or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least
expectations which have a good chance of proving correct." Rules and Order, 36.

The order that emerges from the observance of certain rules and values, while an unintended
result of that observance, must be distinguished from it. "Only when it is clearly recognized that the
order of actions is a factual state of affairs distinct from the rules which contribute to its formation
can it be understood that such an abstract order can be the aim of the rules of conduct. " Ibid, 11 3114.

365Those "relations" that structure a spontaneous social order include such abstract social relations
as buyer and seller; lessor and lessee; lender and borrower; producer and consumer; judge and litigant,
and so on.
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An example of a spontaneous ordering process that operates in the material realm
may assist our understanding of how such forces behave in the social realm. In order to
induce the formation of a crystal, one must create the conditions under which the
individual elements will so arrange themselves that the overall structure of a crystal will
emerge. One cannot deliberately arrange the several elements to produce the desired
formation. Under appropriate conditions, however, each rule-governed element, adapting
itself to its initial position and particular circumstances, will so arrange itself as to result in
the formation of the relatively more complex structure. 367
Liberal society, according to Hayek, is such a spontaneous order. 368 Its character
may be seen more clearly in contrast to a second type of social order found within modern
society-a "made" order or organization. 369 An organization is an order created by the

deliberate arrangement of the several elements according to the conscious intention of a
designing mind. An example from the physical world would be the construction of a
watch or a computer micro-chip wherein each component is deliberately positioned in
accordance with the maker's knowledge and purpose.
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The order to which Hayekian theory refers manifests itself in the matching or coincidence of
plans and expectations across persons who are necessarily ignorant of most of the concrete
circumstances prevailing throughout society and of the concrete aims pursued by their (mostly
unknown) fellows. "The order of society·... must be defined as a condition in which individuals are
able, on the basis of their own respective peculiar knowledge, to form expectations concerning the
conduct of others, which are proved correct by making possible a successful mutual adjustment of
the actions of these individuals." "The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 9.

The existence of such order is what accounts for the fact that the means we require to
realize both our transitory ends and enduring values are made available by strangers who have no
explicit knowledge of our concrete needs and wants. It is what allows the activities of millions of
person who do not and cannot know one another's concrete circumstances and intentions to
"dovetail" or mesh rather than clash or conflict, and this despite the fact that most persons are only
tacitly aware of its existence and do not deliberately aim to produce it.
369

bid, 37.
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An organization, then, is an order that is constructed by someone putting the
elements of a set in their places or directing their movements and which is designed to
fulfill the maker's particular purpose. The technique of organization is, of course,
indispensable for achieving various known purposes. The purpose-independent
spontaneous order 370 of liberal society is composed, in fact, of both individuals and
organizations-business corporations, governmental institutions, and voluntary associations
of all kinds-that have been deliberately created to pursue particular ends.371 The coordination of the activities among the individuals and organizations within society,
however, is accomplished through the spontaneous ordering process that is the "market."
A spontaneous order and an organization may be further distinguished by the type
of rules or laws that necessarily prevail in either order: 1 ) the nomos (the law or private
law), the evolved rules of justice that serve to form and maintain the spontaneous order of
liberal society; and 2) the thesis ("set·law": commands or public law), the deliberately
constructed rules that govern organizational structures (and, in particular, the organization
of government) (see Appendix B for a fuller discussion of these types of rules). 372
Hayek's argument is that the operation of the spontaneous order that is modern liberal
society depends crucially upon the observance of certain kinds of rules-the nomos
mentioned above- for only such abstract general rules induce and maintain that kind of
complex social order .373
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" Because the order of liberal society is not a purposive construction, it will not serve any
specific purpose but will facilitate the achievement of human purposes in general." Gray, Hayek on
Liberty, 35.
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There are two fundamental differences between a spontaneous order and an
organization. First, only a spontaneous order allows for the harmonious co-existence of a
multiplicity of particular ends and ultimate values within society; organizations, as noted,
are designed to serve a unitary hierarchy of ends established by the director(s).
Furthermore, every organization is designed to achieve a specific pre-determined purpose; a
spontaneous social order, on the other hand, possesses no particular purpose but merely
allows for the possible fulfillment of the various and perhaps conflicting purposes of the
several individuals and organizations that compose the order. 374
The second important distinction concerns the amount and kind of knowledge that
can-be utilized in either order and thus the degree of complexity either can attain. A
spontaneous order effectively co-ordinates and utilizes the knowledge, both explicit and
tacit, that only exists dispersed and fragmented among the millions of persons within a
Great Society. Spontaneous ordering processes thus allow the formation of a highly
complex extended order which utilizes knowledge unknown in its totality to any one mind
or group of minds. Such an order emerges as the joint product of the combined and
interacting knowledge possessed by the individual elements and may, therefore, grow to a
degree of complexity unfathomable to any one mind. An organization, on the other hand,
must remain a relatively primitive structure because the knowledge utilized within such an
order is necessarily limited to the knowledge possessed by the designer(s). Its degree of
complexity, in other words, is limited to the extent that reliance on specific commands
prevents the individual elements from acting upon their own particular knowledge.
The more complex the order aimed at, then, the greater reliance must be placed on
general rules rather than specific commands or positive prescriptions because most of the
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several actions in a complex extended order will have to be determined by knowledge and
circumstances known only (and perhaps only tacitly) to the acting persons. Hayek reminds
us that it is only because modern society grew up as a spontaneous order and not as an
organization that it has attained the degree of complexity it has:
To maintain that we must deliberately plan modern
society because it has become so complex is
therefore paradoxical, and a result of a complete
misunderstanding of the circumstances. The fact
is, rather, that we can preserve an order of such
complexity not by the method of directing the
members but only indirectly by enforcing and
improving the rules conducive to the formation of
a spontaneous order. 375
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8

THE ATTRIBUTES AND SOURCE OF LAW

The Attributes of Law
One of Hayek's fundamental contentions is that the law whose observance
generated modern liberal society-law which was "discovered" through the law-finding
process described in chapter two-wi!I necessarily possess certain attributes. 376 He
further contends that all law (and legislation 377 ) enforced by government in a liberal order
should possess those same attributes, for not all types of rules are compatible with the
operation of complex social formations such as liberal society.
According to Hayek, two conceptually and functionally distinct kinds of legal rules
prevail in modern liberal society: 1) the nomos (the law or private law); 378 and 2) the
thesis ("set law," commands, or public law). 379 Only the former of these types of rules

is considered by Hayek to be valid law, the evolved rules of conduct that define justice and
secure order. The latter consists of the consciously designed rules that govern and
structure the organization of government proper-rules, commands, and positive
prescriptions designed to realize particular purposes determined by the director(s) of the

376
This is because judges necessarily search for the general principle implicitly governing each
particular dispute brought before them-for the principle that coheres with the overall body of
historically evolved rules. Moreover, as we have discussed, Hayek maintains that the gradual
extension of a uniform legal code over an extended spatial area necessitated the gradual attenuation
of specific positive obligations and resulted in the abstract, negative rules that, according to Hayek,
induced and maintain the abstract spontaneous order of liberal society. Rules and Order, 85-88.
377 For

Hayek, law and legislation (the deliberate construction of rules) are distinct entities.
Moreover, legislation will only possess the attributes of valid law if it is consciously modeled on it.
378 Rules

379 /bid,

and Order, 94-123.
124-144.
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governmental organization. The distinction between private and public law is one between
standing general rules that all must obey and specific orders to be "executed" by
government officials. One cannot, of course, "execute" or "carry out" a rule of
conduct. 380
As we mentioned, the law-the spontaneously evolved rules that generated the
formation and maintenance of the liberal order-possesses specific attributes that
differentiate it from the rules of organization. 381 According to Hayek, the legal
framework requisite to the operation of the liberal order consists of purpose-independent
abstract rules of just conduct, universally applicable to all persons. These rules generally
take the form of negative prohibitions that delimit a private sphere within which individuals
are guaranteed a free range of action protected from the arbitrary interference of
others. 382

380
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According to Hayek, the nomos or the law that governs the spontaneous order of liberal society
exhibits the following properties:
1.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
7.

Each law is an abstract (general) rule intended to apply to unknown persons in an
unforeseeable number of future circumstances;
It is known, certain, and, in intention, perpetual;
It is the same for all persons (the ideal of "equality under the law");
It generally takes the form of a negative prohibition delimiting the boundary or protected
domain ("property") of each person;
It serves to regulate the relations between private persons or between such persons and the
government;
It is part of a system of "mutually modifying rules"; and
It possesses no specific purpose except the "purpose" of the system of rules as a whole (that
is, to maintain the overall social order). Constitution, 205-212.

382 "There can be no law in the sense of universal rules of conduct which does not determine
boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down rules that enable each to ascertain where he is
free to act .... This was long regarded as self-evident and needing no proof .... [A]ll that we call
civilization has grown up on the basis of that spontaneous order of actions which is made possible by
the delimitation of protected domains of individuals or groups .... " Rules and Order, 107-08.
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The function of the law is to create a secure and stable framework of expectations
so that persons may know which features of their environment they may count on in
making their plans. It thus aims at reducing conflict, establishing certainty, and allowing
for the smoothest possible mutual co-ordination of activities. Furthermore, one should
note that this method of social co-ordination allows for the fullest use of dispersed
knowledge: although each person must take the general rule into account in pursuing his
own ends, he is free to act upon his particular knowledge, bound only by general negative
prohibitions.

The Rules of Organization
According to Hayek, the rules required for the effective functioning of an
organization are conceptually and functionally distinct from those required for the operation
of a spontaneous order. The activities of the individuals and organizations within a
spontaneous order are co-ordinated by the observance of purpose-independent abstract
rules (the law); within an organization, by contrast, activities are co-ordinated by direct
commands and end-dependent rules that serve known goals determined by the director(s)
of the organization.
The most important distinction between laws and commands is the "manner in
which the aims and kriowledge that guide a particular action are distributed between the
authority and the performer." 383 In other words, as we move from commands to law,
the source of the decision about what action is to be taken moves from the issuer to the
acting person. An ideal law is a general abstract rule that limits the means persons may
use in pursuing their ends but does not in itself prescribe any positive end; an ideal

383

Constitution, 1 50.
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command, on the other hand, is a specific order to do a particular thing, prescribing both
the means to be used and the end to be achieved. An ideal command thus serves only the
commander's end and uses only his knowledge; an ideal law, by contrast, merely provides
information which the acting person must take into account but leaves the decision as to
which ends to pursue and what knowledge to utilize to the acting person.
A pure organization, that is, an order produced solely by means of direct commands
to the individual elements, must remain a relatively elementary structure because the only
knowledge utilized in such an order is that of the commanding director(s). Even
organizations, then, must rely on general rules to some extent because the director(s) of all
but.the most simple organizations will desire the individual members to make use of
knowledge the director himself does not possess. The

teleocratic 384 rules that govern

action within an organization, however, are functionally distinct from the
rules that serve a spontaneous order

~n

nomocratic386

that they must be rules for the performance of

tasks which have been deliberately assigned. 386 The rules of organization of government
that comprise the public law, for example, will typically specify the function and tasks of
each individual element within the organization and establish various rules which those
who hold the different positions must follow. There may, then, exist general rules as well
as specific commands within an organization; the rules of organization, however, in
contrast to the rules that structure a spontaneous order, are end-dependent and merely "fill
... in the gaps left by the commands. " 387

384Mirage, 15.
385/bid.
386 Rules and Order, 49.
387/bid.
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The Source of Law

The defining attributes of law did not, of course, emerge full blown from Hayek's or
anyone else's head; rather, "mankind has learned from long and painful experience that the
law of liberty must possess certain attributes." 388 More specifically, Hayek claims that
these attributes have been identified in two ways: first, by retrospectively examining the
attributes of the law that in fact emerged throughout the historical evolution of Western
liberal societies, particularly those with a strong tradition of "law-finding" by judges or
trained jurists. As we have discussed, what such persons were "finding" were those rules
implicitly governing spontaneous interactions within a given community, rules which
referred to a working order of actions which no one had designed and which no one had
the authority or ability to alter at will; and, second, by the scientific investigation of the
nature and operation of complex social formations such as the liberal order. Hayek, we
should note, claims scientific status for the theory of spontaneous order; he suggests,
moreover, that the most important knowledge science has to offer political theory is the
explanation of the "role of law in an ordering mechanism." 389 As we noted earlier,
classical liberalism, to Hayek's mind, "derives" from the discovery of an undesigned order
in social affairs.
Hayek denies, then, that the legal framework that generated and sustains the liberal
order is a product of rcitional construction or an object of political determination. It is, on
his view, an outcome of a transpersonal evolutionary process whereby those rules that
secured the overall order and best contributed to human survival and flourishing were
selected and transmitted over time. Members of liberal society must, he argues, observe

388

Constitution, 205.
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Rule and Order, 71.
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certain rules despite the facts that they have not been deliberately "chosen" 390 and that
their significance may not be fully transparent to the reasoning mind. 391
Moreover, Hayek does not believe the rules of justice are determined by reaching
"consensus" among rational men, 392 but by the rationale and requirements of the
"system as a whole." 393 The development of law is, Hayek argues, a pointed intellectual
task-the lawfinder must discover the rules that cohere with the overall body of accepted
rules that governs a working social order. As such, it must be undertaken by persons well
versed in both jurisprudence and social theory as well as intimately acquainted with the
"tacit dimension" of their society. The "correct" rules are, in a sense,
determined-determined by the requirements of the "existing factual order, " 394 the
unintended yet objective consequence of the observance of an established body of rules

390
"Man has chosen [the liberal market order] only in the sense that he has learned to prefer
something that already operated; and through greater understanding has been able to improve the
conditions for its operation." "Ludwig von Mises," Fortunes, 142.
391
Why should factually unequal persons be subject to the same law? Why should property and
contract be protected? The reasons for our laws, of course, are often not obvious.
392

Which is not to say that discussion may not facilitate the task of discovering the right rules.
The growth of knowledge always depends on the interplay of many minds. The development of law,
like the development of scientific or any other knowledge, proceeds by a trial-and-error process of
elimination (of wrong or unjust rules and refuted hypotheses, respectively). Any judge may err or fail
in the endeavor to find or articulate the correct rule, and the opinions of peers and critics are
indispensable. Moreover, the judge must be able "rationally to defend [his particular decisions]
against all objections that can be raised against [them]" (Rules and Order, 120). This is a different
process, however, from that advocated by adherents to the "rational dialogue" school of thought. As
little as the rules of grammar are determined by "rational consensus" are the rules of law.
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Rules and Order, 101; 113-114.

394

"The Errors of Constructivism," New Studies, 21.
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and values. 396 For Hayek, the task of the judge is to "maintain ... and improve a going
order of actions, and [he] must take his standards from that order .... " 396
Such "determinism" only applies, however, if we wish to live in a liberal society. A
liberal society is indeed a constrained society; once we have committed ourselves to its
preservation, the rules we may adopt are severely circumscribed. Hayek does not, of
course, deny that we are "able" rationally to construct rules that appear to satisfy demands
of reason, justice, equity, desire, or whatever. What he denies is that such constructed
rules can maintain the character of liberal society or provide the basis for a viable, let alone
vibrant, social order.

395/bid.
396Rules and Order, 120.

APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND CRITICAL RATIONALISTS

Men Identified as
Constructivist
Rationalists

John Austin
Francis Bacon
Beccaria
Bentham
G. B. Chisholm
Auguste Comte
Descartes
Hegel
Helvetius
Alexander Herzen
Thomas Hobbes
L. T. Hobhouse
Hans Kelsen
Karl Marx
G. E. Moore
Plato
Hans Reichenbach
Rousseau
Torgny T. Segerstedt
B. F. Skinner
Voltaire

397

397

Men Identified as
Critical Rationalists

Men Identified as
in the Middle

Lord Acton
St. Thonmas Aquinas
Aristotle
Edmund Burke
Adam Ferguson
W. E. Gladstone
David Hume
Bernard Mandeville
Carl Menger
Montesquieu
Karl R. Popper
Adam Smith
Alexis de Tocqueville
Josiah Tucker
Giamattista Vico

Humboldt
Immanuel Kant
John Locke
John Stuart Mill
Herbert Spencer

Source: Arthur M. Diamond, Jr. "F. A. Hayek on Constructivism and Ethics," John Cunningham
Wood and Ronald N. Woods, eds, Friedrich A. Hayek: Critical Assessments, Volume Ill (New York:
Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1991 ), 242-43.
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